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INTRODUCTION
The obedience to orders defense has a unique place in the
criminal justice system. As a military-based defense, it allows a
soldier to escape liability by arguing that she was simply fol1
lowing orders when she committed the supposed crime. The
defense carries the same requirements as many civilian criminal law defenses, such as self-defense, mistake of law, or du2
ress. Most notably, the defendant’s state of mind is subjected
3
to some level of objective scrutiny. This focus on objective scrutiny, however, fails to fully appreciate the government’s improper role in a crime where a soldier is simply doing what she
4
was told. In an effort to provide a defense that better serves
soldiers, this Article presents the first reconceptualization of
the obedience to orders defense that is more closely aligned
with the civilian defense of entrapment. Entrapment—along
with its unique requirements—appropriately acknowledges the
government’s role in pressuring the defendant to commit the
crime. Recognizing that obedience to orders also involves a type
of government coercion, this Article finally reorients the defense accordingly and, in the process, creates a more narrowly

1. See, e.g., United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26–27 (C.M.A. 1973).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. See generally Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233 (2010);
V.F. Nourse, Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1691 (2003).
4. See infra Parts I.E.1, II.A.
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tailored defense that more closely comports with our moral intuitions.
The history of obedience to orders traces back to the nine5
teenth century. Although the scope of immunity that the defense confers has changed through time, its basic contours have
6
not. In a criminal prosecution, the defendant can argue that
she was simply following orders when she committed the crim7
inal act. A successful application of the defense carries two re8
quirements—one subjective, one objective. The subjective component asks whether the defendant knew the order was
9
10
unlawful. If so, the defense will not be successful. Assuming
the defendant did not know the unlawful nature of the order,
11
the second step turns to scrutinizing this assessment. The operative question is whether a soldier of common understanding
in the defendant’s situation also would not have known the or12
der was unlawful. The latter, objective step seeks to examine
whether the defendant’s subjective state of mind was reasona13
ble.
In analyzing this defense, scholars and courts have almost
exclusively focused on interpreting the above-mentioned objec14
tive standard. How do you define a “person of common understanding?” Should it include the soldier’s particular experiences
and training? How easy is it to ascertain illegality when the act
15
implicates broader military objectives? To be sure, these are
important questions. But this inquiry assumes, in the first instance, that the dual model is the right model.
In one respect, the use of dual state-of-mind requirements,
and the use of objective scrutiny specifically, is perhaps not
surprising. Most civilian criminal law defenses also have these

5. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804) (rejecting the defense where Little had orders from the President of the United States); infra
Part I.A.
6. James B. Insco, Defense of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 389, 399–407 (2003).
7. See id. at 399.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See infra Part II.A.
10. See infra Part II.A.
11. See infra Part II.A.
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
15. See infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
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16

two elements. A defendant must have a good faith belief and,
more importantly, this belief must pass a reasonable person
17
standard. Both the “reasonable person” and the “soldier of
common understanding” standards share the same purpose.
They are hypothetical constructs intended to objectively scruti18
nize the defendant’s actions or state of mind. The rationale for
these objective requirements is to promulgate a uniform com19
munity standard that regulates the behavior of citizens.
Obedience to orders has been most closely associated with
the civilian criminal law defenses of mistake of law and duress—both of which carry the aforementioned dual state-of20
mind requirements. Mistake of law involves a defendant who
mistakenly relies on an official statement of the law that a par21
ticular act is not a crime. Based on this interpretation, the defendant carries out the relevant acts, thinking she is doing
nothing illegal. This is like obedience to orders, where a defendant also mistakenly believes that, by following the orders
of her commanding officer, she is not committing a crime. Duress involves a defendant who commits a crime because of
22
threats of immediate bodily harm or death. The defendant is
23
coerced into doing the act. This, too, is similar to the defense
of obedience to orders, where a soldier feels pressured into
obeying a military order because of the threat of criminal punishment for disobedience.
But what sets obedience to orders apart from both duress
and mistake of law is the presence of government coercion. Only the former involves a government soldier ordering an indi24
vidual defendant to commit a crime. In the mistake of law
case, the defendant is making her own choice to rely on an official interpretation, without any pressure from the government,
and in the case of duress, the defendant is pressured by a private citizen. In short, the government plays no active role in ei16. See infra Parts II.A, III.A–B.
17. See generally Elaine M. Chiu, Culture as Justification, Not Excuse, 43
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1317, 1338 (2006) (“Of course, a good faith subjective belief
is essential but it is only the beginning of the inquiry. Objectivity is necessary
for the criminal law to function as the moral voice of the community.”).
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2.
21. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985).
22. United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009).
23. See id.
24. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.2.
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ther defense. This begs the question, then, of why obedience to
orders carries the same dual state-of-mind requirements as
these two defenses. It turns out that the law of entrapment
shares a similar element of government pressure but does not
25
carry the dual state-of-mind requirements. Courts and scholars alike have overlooked the inconsistent treatment of these
two defenses. This Article explores this inconsistency and argues that because both share the unique feature of government
involvement, obedience to orders should be restructured to
more closely parallel entrapment.
The entrapment defense is a relatively recent phenomenon
26
and applies in both military and civilian courts. A defendant
can escape criminal liability by showing that undercover government agents unlawfully pressured or otherwise persuaded
27
her to commit the target crime. Courts use one of two tests.
The subjective test—used by a majority of jurisdictions—
focuses solely on the defendant’s state of mind and whether she
28
was otherwise predisposed to commit the crime. Unlike mistake of law or duress, entrapment does not involve further
29
scrutiny of the defendant’s state of mind. A minority of jurisdictions use the objective test, which focuses solely on the nature of the government’s tactics and whether a law-abiding citi30
zen would have succumbed to the pressure. While this, too, is
an objective standard, its role is quite different from the objective component in mistake of law or duress. There, courts objectively scrutinize the defendant’s subjective state of mind to ascertain whether a reasonable person would have also thought
31
or done the same thing. With entrapment, the objective test
does not in any way examine or otherwise analyze the defend32
ant’s state of mind. Its purpose is simply to ask what a law25. See infra Part IV.A.
26. See infra Part IV.A.1.
27. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452 (1932).
28. See id. at 451. Federal jurisdictions, military courts, and the majority
of states use this test. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL R.C.M. 916(g)
(2012), amended by Exec. Order 13593, 3 C.F.R. 13593 (2012) [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012]; John D. Lombardo, Causation and “Objective” Entrapment: Toward a Culpability-Centered Approach, 43 UCLA. L.
REV. 209, 258 (1996) (noting thirty-nine states do not apply the objective test
and even those that do are implementing more subjective measures).
29. See infra Part IV.A.4.
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1985); Lombardo, supra note 28, at 231–
32.
31. MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.04(3)(b), 2.09(1).
32. Lombardo, supra note 28, at 211–12.
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abiding citizen would have done in the defendant’s situation,
33
regardless of what the defendant actually thought or did.
The rationale for this difference centers on the fact that the
government plays a key role in the crime, and so there is less of
a reason for promulgating a uniform community standard, as in
34
the case of duress or mistake of law. With the subjective
standard, the government is seen as partly culpable for the
crime, thus reducing the relative blameworthiness of the de35
fendant. This focus on culpability invokes retributive notions
36
of justifying punishment. The objective standard, on the other
hand, finds its rationale based squarely on utilitarian
37
grounds. Holding the defendant not liable will deter the government from using overbearing tactics on citizens in the fu38
ture.
Obedience to orders looks a lot like entrapment. Both involve the government pressuring the defendant to commit the
39
crime. To be clear, the type of government involvement may
be different. Entrapment typically involves inducement or
trickery, whereas obedience to orders involves more straight40
forward coercion. But this does not change the common element of active government involvement, something present in
neither duress nor mistake of law. If entrapment as a doctrine
is valued as a legal defense and its underlying rationales importantly account for the government’s role, one cannot ignore
that obedience to orders also shares similar government participation in the crime but currently does not carry the same requirements. In fact, because obedience to orders implicates
qualitatively greater pressure than entrapment, it stands to
reason that the former should, a fortiori, share the same underlying rationales as the latter to support a less stringent level of
41
scrutiny. Disobeying an order carries the threat of criminal

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

See infra Part IV.A.2, 4.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 214.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
See infra Part IV.A.4.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.

2014]

ENTRAPPED

2109

42

punishment. There is no parallel sanction if an entrapped defendant decides not to acquiesce to the government’s pressure.
Using the entrapment model in lieu of the current dual
model would mean applying the subjective or objective test,
without the aforementioned objective scrutiny targeting the defendant’s state of mind. The subjective test would ask whether
a soldier was otherwise predisposed to follow the order, and
with the objective test the focus would be whether a hypothet43
ical soldier could have otherwise refused executing the order.
This Article does not necessarily take a position on which test
should be adopted. Either remolding appropriately recognizes
the role of the government and tracks the rationale for these
44
respective tests. Similar to the rationale of the subjective entrapment test, the soldier in the obedience to orders case would
be less culpable for the crime because the military promulgated
an unlawful order. From a retributive point of view, this makes
sense. The government—through the authority of the superior
45
order—is partly culpable for the crime. With the objective
test, the concern is not with the soldier’s relative culpability
but rather with how to prevent future soldiers from being
46
placed in this compromising situation. Under a utilitarian
model, a successful application of the defense would incentivize
the government to better train commanding soldiers so they do
47
not issue such orders.
While consistency of doctrine and relevance of underlying
rationale are important norms in promulgating the requirements of a criminal law defense, this Article’s reconceptualization of obedience to orders is not simply an academic exercise.
Realigning the defense to mirror entrapment ultimately creates
a defense that is more narrowly tailored to the situation and
thus one that more accurately comports with our intuitive notions of when a soldier should or should not be held liable for
following an unlawful order. It is not problematic for my position that entrapment, relative to other defenses, is considered
42. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at art.
90 (punishing a soldier for assaulting or willfully disobeying superior commissioned officer).
43. Even though soldiers are required to obey orders (unlike their civilian
counterparts who are entrapped), these tests can still effectively be applied in
the military context. See infra Part IV.B.
44. See infra Part IV.B.
45. See infra Part IV.A.4.
46. See infra Part IV.A.4.
47. See infra Part IV.A.4.
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rarely successful. In one respect, this is the nature of criminal
49
law defenses. They are not supposed to be easy to satisfy.
More to the point, there is nothing to suggest that the basic
components of the defense are overly disadvantageous to defendants. The low success rate may have more to do with its
50
application rather than the standard itself. Adopting these elements in the unique military context—with its qualitatively
different level of coercion—ultimately creates an obedience to
orders defense that better serves soldiers caught in a difficult
51
situation.
The Article is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the
history of the obedience to orders defense and its modern-day
codification. Part II surveys scholars’ reactions to this defense
and introduces why it is unique amongst most criminal law defenses. Part III explains why duress and mistake of law defenses, rather than others, have come to be associated with the
obedience to orders defense and why this association is inapposite. This Part highlights the connection between the objective
scrutiny test found in these defenses and the lack of government coercion in the commission of the crime. Part IV describes
the contours of the entrapment defense, including the subjective and objective tests currently used, as well as the unique
role of the government in the defense. This Part goes on to explain why obedience to orders should be restructured to more
closely resemble entrapment. It focuses on applying the doctri48. See Francesca Laguardia, Terrorists, Informants, and Buffons: The
Case for Downward Departures as a Response to Entrapment, 17 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 171, 205 & n.174 (2013) (finding that entrapment is rarely successful and even more rarely successful in cases involving violent crimes because the defendant must admit to having actually committed the crime,
which may pose a hurdle for a jury to nonetheless acquit the defendant); Dru
Stevenson, Entrapment by Numbers, 16 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15 (2005)
(“The conventional wisdom is that it is rarely raised and that it rarely succeeds.”); Stephen G. Valdes, Frequency and Success: An Empirical Study of
Criminal Law Defenses, Federal Constitutional Evidentiary Claims, and Plea
Negotiations, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1709, 1715–16 (2005) (“[T]he entrapment defense arose in 0.08% of cases and succeeded in one-third of these cases.”).
49. Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in the Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1361
(1979) (“From the vantage point of the Constitution, a change in law favorable
to defendants is not necessarily good, nor is an innovation favorable to the
prosecution necessarily bad. In short, determining the constitutionality of
an affirmative defense according to whether it makes conviction more or less
likely than under some prior regime seems to us unsound in principle, as well
as unworkable in practice.”).
50. See Stevenson, supra note 48, at 13 n.33.
51. See infra Part IV.B–C.

2014]

ENTRAPPED

2111

nal elements and their respective underlying rationales to the
obedience to orders case. It concludes by comparing two realworld hypotheticals and illustrating how our intuitions are better served using the entrapment tests instead of the current
dual state-of-mind model.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE OBEDIENCE TO
ORDERS DEFENSE
Part I examines the historical development of the obedi52
ence to orders defense. First, it traces the early use of the defense in the United States from the nineteenth century through
the Civil War. Next, this Part focuses on the state of the defense from World War I through World War II and briefly discusses how the international community has defined the defense. The focus then shifts to the codification of the defense in
military courts. Finally, this Part highlights modern cases that
have utilized the defense, including United States v. Calley, the
foremost comprehensive judicial analysis of obedience to orders.
A. EARLY USE: EIGHTEENTH CENTURY THROUGH THE CIVIL
WAR
The earliest American cases raising the obedience to orders
53
defense steadfastly refused to recognize it as a valid excuse.
The prevailing military code during the early parts of the Republic did not explicitly address this defense, though it prohibited, by threat of criminal punishment, disobeying any lawful
54
order. The first American case to raise the defense was in fact
55
a civil case from the early nineteenth century, Little v.
Barreme, which arose out of the hostilities between France and
56
the United States. The defendant, a Navy captain, seized a
52. Much of this discussion draws from Aubrey Daniel’s summary of the
defense through United States history. See Aubrey M. Daniel, The Defense of
Superior Orders, 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 477, 480–96 (1973).
53. See id. at 483.
54. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF WAR art. VII (1775) (“Any officer or soldier, who
. . . shall disobey any lawful commands of his superior officer, shall suffer such
punishment as shall, according to the nature of his offense, be ordered by the
sentence of a general court-martial.”); Bradley J. Nicholson, Courts-Martial in
the Legion Army: American Military Law in the Early Republic, 1792–1796,
144 MIL. L. REV. 77, 80–84 (1994) (noting that the Articles of War, the early
American military code similar to the British military code, simply required
that soldiers not disobey lawful superior orders).
55. See Insco, supra note 6, at 399.
56. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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Danish ship in reliance on an executive order issued by the
president and was later sued for trespass by the owner of the
57
ship. Congress had passed an act that authorized Navy cap58
tains to seize ships bound for a French port. However, the
president issued an executive order that exceeded this grant to
59
include any ship bound to or from a French port. In good faith
reliance on this illegal executive order, the Navy captain seized
60
a ship that was not headed to a French port. In a subsequent
suit for damages, the captain raised the possibility of the de61
fense to the ship owner’s trespass claim.
Writing for the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall,
while ultimately rejecting the defense, debated whether relief
should be warranted in light of the nature of military service
and the necessity of following orders:
That implicit obedience which military men usually pay to the orders
of their superiors, which indeed is indispensably necessary to every
military system, appeared to me strongly to imply the principle that
those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought to justify the
person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is placed by
the laws of his country in a situation which in general requires that
62
he should obey them.

Nevertheless, Marshall concluded that as a matter of law,
the captain’s actions constituted trespass, and no instruction by
a superior could legalize or otherwise change the unlawful na63
ture of this act.
United States v. Bright was the first criminal case to apply
64
the standard set out in Barreme. The defendant, a Pennsylvania state militia member, was ordered by the Pennsylvania
governor to interfere with the official duties of a United States
65
marshal. Like the order in Barreme, the governor’s command
66
exceeded his authority. The defendant was criminally charged
for this interference and raised obedience to orders as a de57. Id. at 177–78.
58. Id. at 177.
59. Id. at 178.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 179. During this time, the Court also affirmed that a soldier’s
disobedience of a lawful order warrants criminal punishment. See Wilkes v.
Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 88, 91–92 (1849).
63. Barreme, 6 U.S. at 179.
64. See United States v. Bright, 24 F. Cas. 1232 (C.C.D. Pa. 1809); Daniel,
supra note 52, at 483.
65. Bright, 24 F. Cas. at 1233–34.
66. Id. at 1237–38.
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fense. In rejecting this defense, the Court cited Barreme and
stated:
The argument [for an obedience to orders defense] is imposing, but
very unsound. In a state of open and public war where military law
prevails, and the peaceful voice of municipal law is drowned in the
din of arms, great indulgences must necessarily be extended to the
acts of subordinate officers done in obedience to the orders of their
superiors. But even there the order of a superior officer to take the
life of a citizen, or to invade the sanctity of his house and to deprive
him of his property, would not shield the inferior against charge of
68
murder or trespass, in the regular judicial tribunals of the country.

The circuit court nevertheless seemed to acknowledge the
difficult position the defendant faced. Had he not obeyed the
governor’s order, the court recognized that he could have been
prosecuted before a military or state court for failing to obey a
69
superior order. The court ultimately did not give this consideration much weight, as it also noted that any such prosecution
would lead to an acquittal because the order itself was unlaw70
Other criminal cases during this period similarly
ful.
acknowledged the importance of following military orders but
concluded that they should not serve as a defense to an other71
wise unlawful act.
Shortly thereafter, United States v. Jones became the first
case to suggest the circumstances under which such a defense
72
may potentially apply. The case involved a defendant who was
73
charged with piracy and threatening of bodily harm. The defendant, along with other members of the crew and upon the
order of his captain, boarded another vessel, looted valuables,
74
and assaulted members of the other vessel’s crew. The court
rejected the defendant’s argument that he was merely following
75
the orders of his captain. The court began by noting that “[n]o
military or civil officer can command an inferior to violate the
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1238.
70. Id.
71. See, e.g., United States v. Bevans, 24 F. Cas. 1138, 1140 (C.C.D. Mass.
1816) (recognizing the importance of following military orders but ultimately
concluding that this importance does not matter when the orders “are against
the express provisions of the law”); Hyde v. Melvin, 11 Johns 521, 523–24
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814) (holding the fact that the defendant acted under the
command of his colonel as no excuse for his actions).
72. See United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 657–58 (C.C.D. Pa. 1813).
73. Id. at 654–55.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 657–58.
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laws of his country; nor will such command excuse . . . the
76
act.” Focusing on the state of mind of the defendant, the court
went on to say that a defendant could not avail himself of this
defense where “he knows, or ought to know” that the action or77
dered was illegal. Here, it was possible that the defendant and
the accompanying crew—regardless of any orders commanding
the contrary—either knew or should have known that assault
78
and stealing from another vessel were illegal acts. This early
test foreshadows modern versions of the defense and its focus
on both the actual state of mind of the defendant (subjective
component) and the state of mind of a reasonable person in the
79
defendant’s circumstances (objective component).
The Civil War and its aftermath prompted other cases that
further developed the elements of the defense and its related
80
applicability. One notable case, Riggs v. State, concerned a defendant who may have been given an order by his superior of81
ficer to kill another officer. The murder was not provoked or
82
otherwise part of combat. The issue, however, was whether a
defendant could raise the defense that he was simply obeying
76. Id. at 657. Other cases from this period affirmed this test: whether the
defendant knew or should have known the order was unlawful. See, e.g.,
Despan v. Olney, 7 F. Cas. 534, 535–36 (C.C.D. R.I. 1852) (“If [a military officer] receives an order from his superior, which, from its nature, is within the
scope of his lawful authority, and nothing appears to show that that authority
is not lawfully exerted in the particular case, he is bound to obey it; and if it
turns out, that his superior had secretly abused or exceeded his power, the superior, who is thus guilty, must answer for it, not the inferior, who reasonably
supposed he was only doing his duty.”).
77. Jones, 26 F. Cas. at 658.
78. See id. The jury ultimately returned a verdict of “not guilty,” however.
Id.
79. See infra Part I.D.
80. In 1863, President Lincoln promulgated revised rules of combat,
dubbed the Lieber Code (because they were based on Professor Leiber’s instructions), which sought to supplement the Articles of War. This new Code
did not address the obedience to orders defense. See Daniel, supra note 52, at
484–85 (discussing how Professor Lieber, assuming that the courts would control the issue, left out the obedience to orders defense from the Lieber Code);
Gary D. Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application
in American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 481, 491 (1999); Gideon M. Hart,
Note, Military Commissions and the Lieber Code: Toward a New Understanding of the Jurisdictional Foundations of Military Commissions, 203 MIL. L.
REV. 1, 34–35 (2010) (discussing how the Lieber Code sought to update the Articles of War).
81. See Riggs v. State, 43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) 85, 88–89 (Tenn. 1866). One of
the issues before the Tennessee Supreme Court was whether the defendant
actually heard the order. See id. at 90.
82. See id. at 89.
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83

the orders of his superior officer. In rejecting this excuse, the
trial court distinguished a lawful superior order—which a subordinate is bound to follow and would provide a defense to a
criminal charge—from an unlawful order, which cannot excuse
84
criminal behavior. In describing the latter, the court explained the objective component of the defense:
[A]n order illegal in itself, and not justified by the rules and usages of
war, or in its substance being clearly illegal, so that a man of ordinary
sense and understanding would know, as soon as he heard the order
read or given, that such order was illegal, would afford [the defend85
ant] no protection for a crime committed under such order . . . .

The jury found that under the circumstances, any man of
“common mind” would have known that the order to shoot was
86
unlawful and would have refrained from killing the officer.
The court did not specify from where this standard arose, but
its focus on ordinary sense and common understanding is an
87
early expression of the objective standard currently used.
Not all courts denied the defense based on this standard.
In one notable Civil War case, In re Fair, two soldiers were
charged with murder after shooting another soldier escaping
88
from custody. The soldiers were under orders to shoot two
prisoners escaping custody if they did not stop when they or89
dered them to. The court found the defendants not liable for
the charge partially on the ground that they were following or90
ders. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the
state of mind of the defendants as well as what a person of
common understanding would have done. As to the first, the
court held that the defendants should not be convicted if they
“acted under such orders in good faith . . . [and] with an honest
91
purpose to perform [their] supposed duty.” Turning to the objective requirement, the court reasoned: “While I do not say
83. See id. at 86–87.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id. (noting that the jury convicted the defendant after receiving
these instructions on the obedience to orders defense).
87. See infra Part I.D. On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court awarded
the defendant a new trial due to the lack of evidence on the record. See Riggs,
43 Tenn. (3 Cold.) at 90–91. However, it found “no error” with the trial court’s
instruction on the obedience to orders defense. Id. at 86–87.
88. In re Fair, 100 F. 149, 150 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900).
89. Id. The order applied to both escaping prisoners, but it appears that
the defendants only found and ultimately killed the one. See id.
90. See id. at 154–58.
91. Id. at 155.
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that the order given to [the defendants] was in all particulars a
lawful order, I do say that the illegality of the order, if illegal it
was, was not so much so as to be apparent and palpable to the
92
commonest understanding.”
In articulating the objective standard, other cases from this
period similarly focused on ordinary sense or common under93
standing as the appropriate litmus test.
B. ABSOLUTE DEFENSE: WORLD WARS I AND II
For a brief period starting just prior to World War I, the
military, in sharp contrast to the prevailing standard established by civilian courts, allowed soldiers to invoke obedience to
orders as a complete defense without any scrutiny of the de94
fendant’s state of mind. Under the revised military policy, soldiers would not be punished for offenses as long as they were
95
acting under orders of their commanders. There was no eval92. Id. It should be noted that, in finding the defendants not guilty, the
court also emphasized the fact that the defendants shot to disable the escaping
prisoner, not to kill him. See id. Ultimately, the court felt that it should not
intervene because the escaping prisoner had been charged with a military offense, desertion, and the defendants were attempting to enforce military law.
See id. at 156–58.
93. See, e.g., McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)
(“Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at first blush it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding that the order is illegal, I
cannot but think that the laws should excuse the military subordinate when
acting in obedience to the orders of his commander.”). But see Jones v. Commonwealth, 64 Ky. (1 Bush) 34, 39–40 (Ky. 1866) (denying the defense of obedience to orders outright because the act was illegal).
94. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 488–89; Solis, supra note 80, at 495–96.
95. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, RULES OF
LAND WARFARE § 366 (1914) (“Individuals of the armed forces will not be punished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders.”). This army instruction served as a
successor to the Lieber Code. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 488; Solis, supra
note 80, at 491. This army instruction was not inconsistent with the contemporaneous publication, A Manual for Courts-Martial, Courts of Inquiry, and of
Other Procedure Under Military Law, a military law manual that outlined the
logistics of conducting a court-martial. See OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF
INQUIRY, AND OF OTHER PROCEDURE UNDER MILITARY LAW, at xiii–xiv (1918)
[hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1918]; Solis, supra note 80, at
496. The Manual explicitly provided that disobedience to a superior order was
punishable unless the order was plainly illegal. See MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, 1918, supra, at app. 1, art. 64. Pursuant to the Rules of Land Warfare, there was no punishment if the soldier followed this unlawful order. Id.
And if he decided against following this unlawful order, the Manual explicitly
exempted him from the crime of disobedience to orders. See Solis, supra note
80, at 495–96.
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uation of what the solider knew or a person of common under96
standing would have known. During this period, there do not
appear to be any records of courts-martial relating to the “killing or maltreatment of German soldiers” by American sol97
diers. In the one case where the issue was raised, the solider
was found not guilty of killing a prisoner simply because he
98
was following orders.
This remained the state of affairs until World War II, when
the military revised its position to be comparable to the prevail99
ing civilian standard prior to World War I. Once again, the defense was not automatically an absolute bar to prosecution. The
revised military code allowed obedience to orders to serve as a
potential defense or mitigation for punishment but also noted
that individuals who clearly violated laws and customs of war
100
could be punished.
C. INTERNATIONAL LAW
Historically, international law has not provided a consistent approach to the availability of the obedience to orders
101
defense.
Major international treaties, by and large, have
102
failed to address the defense. The Hague Convention, after
World I, and the Geneva Convention, after World War II, were

96. Cf. Daniel, supra note 52, at 488 (“[O]bedience to orders became an
absolute defense.”).
97. Id. at 488 & n.31.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 488–90. The 1928 edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial,
however, did mention the availability of the obedience to orders defense. See
MANUAL
FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL
R.C.M. 148a, at 163 (1928), established by Exec. Order 4773 [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1928] (citation omitted) (“The general rule is
that the acts of a subordinate officer or soldier, done in good faith and without
malice in compliance with his supposed duty, or of superior orders, are justifiable, unless such acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his authority, and
such that a man of ordinary sense and understanding would know to be illegal.”).
100. See U.S. DEP’T OF WAR, FM 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE § 345.1
(1944) (“Individuals . . . who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may
be punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts complained of were done
pursuant to the order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into
consideration in determining culpability, either by way of defense or in mitigation of punishment.”).
101. See MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE & THE LAW OF WAR 41 (1999); Insco, supra note 6, at 407–10.
102. Insco, supra note 6, at 407.
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103

conspicuously silent on the issue. Just after World War I,
however, the issue was tentatively raised in connection with
war crimes committed by Germans. An Allied-led war crime
commission proposed international prosecutions without the
104
benefit of an obedience to orders defense. Dissents by the
United States and Britain—who feared the precedential effect
such a rule might have on their own soldiers—ultimately left
the commission’s work unresolved, and the prosecutions were
105
relegated to German national courts. A similar commission
created by the newly formed United Nations after World War II
also addressed this defense in the context of war crime prosecu106
tions. This commission recognized that the “[t]he question of
individual responsibility and punishment in cases in which offences were committed upon the orders of a . . . superior authority by a subordinate pledged by law to obey superior orders,
107
is one of great difficulty.” Following American courts on the
issue, the United States proposed to the commission that the
obedience to orders defense should be rejected “if the order was
so manifestly contrary to the laws of war that a person of ordinary sense and understanding would know or should know . . .
108
that such an order was illegal.” Because the member states
could not reach an agreement, the commission ultimately recommended that the validity of the defense be left to national
109
courts.
It was not until the Nuremberg Charter in 1945 and the
resulting Nazi war trials that the Allied-led international
community had the opportunity to take a strong and unified
110
stance on the availability of the defense. Due to the nature of
103. See id.; Howard S. Levie, The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of the Superior Orders, 30 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV.
183, 199–200 (1991).
104. See Solis, supra note 80, at 496–97.
105. See id. at 497–99. It appears that the German courts allowed the
German soldiers to raise the defense in what became known as the Leipzig
Trials. See id. at 499.
106. Id. at 509.
107. U.N. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR 274
(1948) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION]; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 483.
108. HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra
note 107, at 278; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 510.
109. See HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 107, at 278; see also Solis, supra note 80, at 509–10.
110. See Solis, supra note 80, at 515–16.
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the atrocities, the International Military Tribunal categorically
rejected, as a way to avoid liability, the defense that a German
soldier was simply following orders to kill innocent civilians as
111
a way to avoid liability. The pertinent provision of the Charter stated that the “fact that the defendant acted pursuant to
order of his . . . superior shall not free him from responsibility,
but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tri112
bunal determines that justice so requires.” The last clause
simply served the function of reducing a defendant’s sentence,
113
not absolving the individual of all liability.
The resulting trials under the Nuremberg Charter narrowly circumscribed when a soldier could be relieved of responsibil114
ity for his actions. The Tribunal stated: “The true test, which
is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations,
is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was
115
in fact possible.” The “moral choice” test required a showing

111. See id. James Insco has suggested that similar considerations, along
with evidentiary rule changes, may explain why the United States chose to
create separate military tribunals for the attacks surrounding September 11th
instead of using the established procedures under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, see infra Part I.D (describing the history of the Code), which
would have allowed for an obedience to orders defense. See Insco, supra note 6,
at 411–17. The rules promulgated for the tribunals make no mention of the
availability of the defense. Id. at 412. Given the nature of the terrorist attacks,
it is not clear how such a defense would be viable. See id. at 412–13. However,
Insco argues that allowing such a defense—which would probably only apply
in limited circumstances—may have the benefit of providing legitimacy to the
proceedings. Id. at 416–17.
112. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 8, in 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 12 (1947); Daniel, supra note 52, at
490.
113. Cf. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF “OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS” IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 115–17 (1965) (“[The Charter] precludes any
possibility of taking the fact of obedience to orders into account for the purpose
of relieving the defendant of responsibility in the context of any defence whatsoever . . . .”).
114. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 490–91.
115. United States v. Ohlendorf (The Einsatzgruppen Case), in 4
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 471 (1947) [hereinafter The Einsatzgruppen Case] (quoting 1 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note
112, at 224) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www
.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-IV.pdf; see also Daniel,
supra note 52, at 490. U.S. Military Tribunal II-A tried the defendants in The
Einsatzgruppen Case after the International Military Tribunal declared organizations of which they were members to be criminal. See The Einsatzgruppen
Case, supra, at 3, 22. In deciding the case, the U.S. Military Tribunal relied
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that the solider was under duress or threat of serious bodily
116
harm from another when he committed the act. This Article
later provides greater detail on the connection between the
117
obedience to orders and the duress defenses. For now, it is
enough to say that the Nuremberg trials envisioned duress as
118
conceptually separate from an obedience to orders defense. In
other words, the accused could not rely on the inherent coercion
of the superior order as a defense. Something more was required, such as threats or other coercion whereby the soldier
119
had no real choice in the matter. Following the Tribunal’s
lead, the U.S. Military Tribunal trying The Einsatzgruppen
Case reasoned in the following way: “The test to be applied is
whether the subordinate acted under coercion or whether he
himself approved of the principle involved in the order . . . . Superior means superior in capacity and power to force a certain
120
act. It does not mean superiority only in rank . . . .” Other tribunals, including the Criminal Tribunals of Rwanda and Yugoslavia, have followed a similar path, applying the obedience to
121
defense only for mitigation, not for exoneration.
A noteworthy exception to the historical unavailability of
the defense in international law is the Rome Statute of 1997,
which established the permanent International Criminal
122
Court. While the United States is not a party to the statute,
the court allows for the defense and employs a standard similar
123
to that used by American courts. A defendant can take adheavily on principles promulgated by the International Military Tribunal. See
id. passim (citing the International Military Tribunal throughout the opinion).
116. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 491.
117. See infra Part III.A.
118. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 490–92. There is, however, some debate
among scholars as to whether this “moral choice” test was a separate defense
of compulsion or duress—and thus served to supplement the Charter’s provision on the availability of the obedience to orders defense—or instead something intended to lessen the blanket rule established by the Charter. See
DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 150–54.
119. See Daniel, supra note 52, at 491. Justice Jackson, in his opening remarks for the prosecution, explained that while the obedience to orders defense was not available under the Charter, “we do not argue that the circumstances under which one commits an act should be disregarded in judging its
legal effect.” DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 125–27.
120. The Einsatzgruppen Case, supra note 115, at 480; see also supra note
115.
121. See Insco, supra note 6, at 409.
122. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 1, 33, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
123. See id; Insco, supra note 6, at 409 (discussing the circumstances under
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vantage of the defense if he “did not know that the order was
124
unlawful” and if “[t]he order was not manifestly unlawful.”
D. CODIFICATION OF THE DEFENSE: THE AMERICAN MILITARY
STANDARD
It was not until after World War II that the American military finally codified the obedience to orders defense and the
conditions of its application. Congress enacted the Uniform
125
Code of Military Justice in 1950, and while it did not mention
126
the defense, the revised Manual for Courts-Martial—an executive order outlining the procedures of court-martial proceed127
ings—explicitly addressed the applicability of the defense. It
provided:
[T]he acts of a subordinate, done in good faith in compliance with his
supposed duty or orders, are justifiable. This justification does not exist, however, when those acts are manifestly beyond the scope of his
authority, or the order is such thata man of ordinary sense and un128
derstanding would know it to be illegal . . . .

The language tracks the historical focus on both the subordinate’s subjective state of mind and an objective person’s
129
common understanding. This provision is not substantially
changed in the current edition of the Manual for CourtsMartial, which states, “It is a defense to any offense that the
accused was acting pursuant to orders unless the accused knew

which the International Criminal Court recognizes the obedience to orders defense); infra Part I.E (discussing the standard currently used by American
courts).
124. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 122, at
art. 33(1).
125. Uniform Code of Military Justice, Pub. L. No. 81-506, 64 Stat. 107
(1950) (repealed 1956). This enactment also established the military judicial
system and its various levels of appellate review. Id.
126. See id.
127. The Manual for Courts-Martial dates back to 1890, see P. HENRY RAY,
COMMANDING DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR COURTS-MARTIAL AND JUDGE ADVOCATES (1890), and has had numerous versions since then. See, e.g., supra notes
95, 99 (including some of the editions of the Manual for Courts-Martial). The
earliest mention of obedience to orders came in the 1928 edition, which included similar language to the version of the Manual promulgated after Congress
passed the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See supra note 99; infra note 128
and accompanying text.
128. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL ¶ 197b (1951), as reprinted in Exec.
Order No. 10,214, 3 C.F.R. Supp. E.O. 10,214, ¶ 197b (1949–1951) [hereinafter
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 1951].
129. See supra notes 77–98.
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the orders to be unlawful or a person of ordinary sense and un130
derstanding would have known the orders to be unlawful.”
The Korean War and its aftermath allowed for the first application of the now codified defense. In United States v. Kinder, the defendant, who was on sentry duty, captured a Korean
131
intruder. He brought the intruder to the guard-house, and his
superior officer ordered the defendant to execute the individu132
There was no evidence that the intruder posed any
al.
133
threat. The defendant was charged with premeditated mur134
der and raised the obedience to orders defense. The court cat135
egorically rejected the defense. Citing to a case discussing
Riggs v. State, the court said that even if the defendant did not
know the order was unlawful, a man of common understanding
would have known that taking a life in this way was unlawful
136
and would not have followed the order.
E. MODERN CASES
1. United States v. Calley
Numerous decisions during the Vietnam conflict reaffirmed
the principle that the obedience to orders defense is not available if the order would have been manifestly illegal to a person
137
of common understanding. One notable case, United States v.
Calley, provided the first comprehensive judicial analysis of
130. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(d).
It is important to note that a successful application of this defense does not
bar prosecution of the commanding officer who gave the unlawful order. See
Jason Sengheiser, Note, Command Responsibility for Omissions and Detainee
Abuse in the “War on Terror”, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 693, 713–14 (2008)
(discussing command responsibility and how commanding officers can be criminally charged for orders they give).
131. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742, 753 (A.F.B.R. 1954).
132. Id. at 753–54.
133. See id. at 753–55.
134. See id. at 752, 763.
135. See id. at 774.
136. See id. at 771–74 (“Human life being regarded as sacred, moral, religious and civil law proscriptions against its taking existing throughout our society, we view the order as commanding an act so obviously beyond the scope
of authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on its face as to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of ordinary sense and understanding.”). The Army later clarified the obedience to orders defense in accordance with this standard. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FM 27-10, THE LAW
OF LAND WARFARE § 509 (1956).
137. See, e.g., United States v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108, 115–17 (C.M.A.
1969); United States v. Griffin, 39 C.M.R. 586, 589–90 (A.B.R. 1968).
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this objective standard and how it should be applied. The defendant, Lieutenant Calley, was charged and convicted by a jury for the murder of dozens of civilians in the village of My Lai
139
in South Vietnam. The defendant claimed that he was following the order of his commanding officer, who had instructed
140
him to kill the civilians. One of the issues before the United
States Court of Military Appeals (the highest military court at
the time) was the appropriate objective standard for adjudicat141
ing the obedience to orders defense.
The trial judge had instructed the jury that the acts of a
subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order should
impose no criminal liability unless the defendant knew the order was unlawful or a person of common understanding would
142
have known this. In making a determination as to the defendant’s subjective knowledge of the order’s unlawfulness, the
trial court advised the jury to consider all relevant matters, including the defendant’s rank, age, educational background,
143
training, and prior operational experience in the area. It appears that the instruction relating to the defendant’s subjective
144
knowledge was not in dispute on appeal. The defense simply
claimed that the evidence showed Calley subjectively believed
that the civilians were part of the enemy he was ordered to
145
kill.
The issue for the appellate court focused on the objective
146
standard of palpable or manifest illegality. The trial judge instructed the jury that even if they found the defendant did not
138. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 29 (C.M.A. 1973).
139. See id. at 21. According to Calley, his commanding officer gave him an
order to destroy the My Lai village, though there was conflicting evidence of
such an order. See id. at 23–24. Calley alleged that the commanding officer
gave the order, first, a day before the strike during a briefing on the mission
and then again by radio during the day of the engagement. Id. Calley ordered
his subordinates to kill the villagers, including women and children, who were
at the time being guarded but posed no danger to the soldiers. See id. at 24.
Calley claimed these villagers were, however, hindering the platoon’s ability to
progress. See id. at 33. It turned out that some of Calley’s subordinates refused to follow his instruction to kill the villagers. See id. at 24.
140. See id. at 23–24.
141. See id. at 26–29.
142. Id. at 27.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 24–25. The general findings of guilt at the trial court did not
specify whether the jury found that the defendant knew the order was unlawful. Id. at 25.
146. See id. at 27.
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know the order was unlawful, he would still be guilty if they
found that “under the circumstances, a man of ordinary sense
and understanding would have known the order was unlaw147
ful.” The instructions stated that jurors should not “focus on
Lieutenant Calley and the manner in which he perceived the
148
legality of the order found to have been given him.” Rather,
the focus should be on a person “of ordinary sense and understanding under the circumstances” and whether “in light of all
the surrounding circumstances” this hypothetical construct
149
would have known the order was unlawful. The court thus
seemed to adopt a non-individualized objective standard. The
defendant claimed the standard requiring that the order be
palpably illegal to a person of “common understanding“ was too
strict and should be changed to a person of “commonest under150
standing.” The defendant argued that using the former would
prejudice those soldiers at the lower end of the experi151
ence/understanding spectrum who fall below this standard.
These individuals would have to face the dilemma of choosing
either a criminal penalty for disobedience of an order (death,
during time of war) or an equally serious penalty for following
152
the unlawful order. While criminal punishment only applies
to disobedience of lawful orders, a soldier who does not know
the order is unlawful would not necessarily benefit from this
153
restriction.
The majority opinion for the appeal took some time examining the competing interests involved. Citing to an authority
discussing Riggs, as well as citing to cases, the court, on the
one hand, noted that the “common understanding” standard
154
has had a long history in American military jurisprudence.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See id.
152. Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, pt. IV, art. 90c(2) (1984),
as reprinted in Exec. Order No. 12,473, 3 C.F.R. pts. 100–101 Exec. Order
12,473 (1984–1985) (incorporating by reference the text of the Manual, located
at 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (Apr. 23, 1984)) [hereinafter MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, 1984] (explaining what constitutes disobeying a superior officer).
Disobedience of a lawful order during time of war may result in the death
penalty. See id. at pt. IV, art. 90a.
153. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, at 28 & n.1; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
1984, supra note 152, at pt. IV, art. 90a (stating that any soldier who “willfully
disobeys a lawful command of his superior” shall be punished).
154. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, at 28.
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However, the court also recognized that in the stress of combat,
a soldier cannot be expected to make a refined legal determina155
tion as to the legality of an order. The court did not find this
to be problematic, because, except in rare instances where the
order was manifestly illegal, subordinates should presumptive156
ly follow a superior’s order. As to the defendant’s specific
charge of error, the court ultimately concluded that there was
157
no prejudice. It found that “whatever conceptual difference
there may be between a person of ‘commonest understanding’
and a person of ‘common understanding,’ that difference could
not have had any impact on [the jury] receiving the respective
158
wordings in instructions.” The court focused on the fact that
the defendant killed unarmed women and children—acts that
under any objective standard would have been manifestly ille159
gal.
The dissent challenged the majority’s conclusion that the
difference in jury instructions as to the objective state-of-mind
160
requirement would have had no meaningful impact. The dissent argued that the current standard—and its focus on com161
mon understanding—was too stringent. The dissent claimed
the standard permitted serious punishment for those whose
“training and attitude incline[d] them either to be enthusiastic
about compliance with orders or not to challenge the authority
162
of their superiors.” According to the dissent, the proposed instruction of “commonest understanding,” however, “properly
balance[d] punishment for the obedience of an obviously illegal
order” against a soldier’s duty to follow a superior’s direct or163
der. The dissent went on to elaborate how best to relay this
164
objective state-of-mind requirement to the jury. It suggested
that a jury should find the defendant guilty notwithstanding an
obedience to orders defense if “almost every member of the
armed forces would have immediately recognized that the order
was unlawful, and . . . that the [defendant] should have recognized the order’s illegality as a consequence of his age, grade,
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 28–29.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 29.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 31–33 (Darden, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 31.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 31–32.
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165

intelligence, experience, and training.” The dissent’s proposed
standard would have provided additional protection for the defendant. For even if almost every member of the armed forces
would find the order unlawful, the particular experiences and
training of the defendant might suggest impunity. In other
words, the dissent argued the defense should be successful as
long as a soldier of the commonest understanding with the defendant’s training and experience similarly would not have
166
found the order to be unlawful.
The dissent further explained that this standard could
167
have resulted in a different verdict for Calley. It pointed to
Calley’s specific background and training, which together may
have caused someone of the commonest understanding or
someone in his shoes to not recognize the order to be unlaw168
ful. Along with testimony showing that Calley’s briefing contained specific orders to kill all individuals, including women
and children, the dissent also specifically pointed to Calley’s
169
prior experience with hostile civilians in the area. In the past,
when villagers were left behind by his unit, Calley’s unit had
taken sniper fire from the rear, presumably from these individ170
uals. In addition, Calley had apparently received faulty intelligence that the villagers were not innocent and were either en171
Combined, these facts,
emies or enemy sympathizers.
according to the dissent, suggested that a soldier of commonest
understanding in the defendant’s position might not have read172
ily realized that the order to kill the villagers was unlawful.
165. Id. at 32. Interestingly, United States v. Kinder seemed to employ a
standard closer to the one articulated by the dissent in Calley. See 14 C.M.R.
742, 744 (A.F.B.R. 1954) (“In our view no rational being of the [defendant’s]
age, formal education, and military experience could have, under the circumstances, considered the order lawful.”).
166. The dissent’s proposal appears to conflate two potentially distinct objective state-of-mind standards. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 31–33. The first is a person of commonest understanding with no shared traits of the defendant, and
the second is a person of commonest understanding with the same experience,
training, etc. Id. It is not clear exactly what standard the dissent seeks to support or whether Calley’s decision to follow the order could be excused on the
former alone. Resolution of this issue is not relevant here. The main takeaway
is that the dissent’s proposed instruction would be more generous to potential
defendants than the standard affirmed by the majority.
167. Id. at 33.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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2. Other Cases
More recent cases have followed the majority’s holding in
Calley and its reliance on common understanding as the appropriate objective state of mind standard. United States v.
Pacheco involved a soldier who was charged with larceny after
taking a weapon as a souvenir from a weapon’s cache during an
173
operation in Haiti. Citing Calley, the court noted that any
applicable obedience to orders defense would not succeed if the
order was palpably illegal, which was analyzed from the per174
spective of a man of ordinary sense and understanding.
The issues surrounding the detainees held in Iraq provided
a more recent application of the defense. In defense of maltreatment charges of a detainee during an interrogation, the
defendant in United States v. Smith argued that he was simply
175
following orders. The court affirmed the trial judge’s instructions that any obedience to orders defense would not excuse liability unless “the [defendant] knew that the order was unlawful or unless the order was one which a person of ordinary
common sense under the circumstances would know to be un176
lawful.”

173. United States v. Pacheco, 56 M.J. 1 (C.A.A.F. 2001).
174. Id. at 7 (Sullivan, J., dissenting). Interestingly, this case involved an
alleged order that was more discretionary than imperative in nature. Part
III.B more closely analyzes this issue under the rubric of mistake of law.
175. United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
176. Id. at 321 n.7. The defendant was a military servicemember trained as
a dog handler and was stationed in the confinement facility at Abu Ghraib,
Iraq. Id. at 318–19. During an interrogation of one of the detainees, the defendant allowed his unmuzzled dog to bark in the detainee’s face and to pull a
sandbag off the detainee’s head with its teeth. Id. Charged with, inter alia,
maltreatment, the defendant argued that he was simply following the orders
of his commanding officer. Id. at 319–20. The court found that no evidence had
been introduced that such an order was in fact given. Id. at 321. Other trials
relating to detainee abuse similarly raised the obedience to orders defense and
questioned whether the soldier knew or should have known the order was illegal. See Kate Zernike, Soldiers Testify on Orders to Soften Prisoners in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/13/national/
13abuse.html (noting that defendant unsuccessfully raised obedience to orders
defense in prosecution for detainee abuse); Natalia M. Restivo, Defense of Superior Orders in International Criminal Law as Portrayed in Three Trials:
Eichmann, Calley and England 20–25 (Sept. 12, 2006) (unpublished student
paper, Cornell Law School) (same), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell
.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=lps_papers.
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II. THE DUAL STATE-OF-MIND REQUIREMENTS
Part II briefly explores scholarly reactions to the current
two-part requirement and suggests why this standard is not
the appropriate model for the obedience to orders defense. This
Part begins by detailing the difficulty associated with defining
the objective portion of the test. Next, it provides an explanation for why this objective requirement has mistakenly become
associated with the defense and introduces the notion of government coercion as something unique to obedience to orders.
A. REACTIONS TO CURRENT MODEL
Most of the discussion surrounding the obedience to orders
defense has focused on how best to interpret and apply the two
177
The subjective requirement is relatively
requirements.
straightforward and seeks to answer the question of “whether
178
[the person] actually knew [the] orders to be unlawful.” Here,
the jury looks at the defendant’s background, including her age,
179
education, training, and experience. Knowledge, of course,
180
means something akin to substantial certainty. Simply think177. See, e.g., Ziv Bohrer, The Superior Orders Defense: A Principal-Agent
Analysis, 41 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (2012); William George Eckhardt, My
Lai: An American Tragedy, 68 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. REV. 671 (2000); Lieutenant Colonel Christopher T. Fredrikson, Annual Review of Developments in Instructions, ARMY LAW., May 2011, at 25; Leslie C. Green, Superior Orders and
Command Responsibility: Fifteenth Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International
Law, 175 MIL. L. REV. 309, 314–15 (2003); Michael Kenneth Isenman, 88
MICH. L. REV. 1474 (1990) (reviewing HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE
HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989)); Martha Minow, Living Up to Rules:
Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence, 52 MCGILL L.J. 1 (2007).
178. United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 27 (C.M.A. 1973).
179. See id. Recent jury instructions support this individualized assessment. The Army model instructions, for instance, provide that in determining
whether the defendant knew the order was illegal, the jury must “resolve this
issue by looking at the situation subjectively, through the eyes of the [defendant]. You should consider the [defendant’s] (age) (education) (training) (rank)
(background) (experience).” U.S. DEP’T OF ARMY, PAM. 27-9, MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK § 5-8-1 (1 Jan. 2010) [hereinafter MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK].
180.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the
attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves
a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that
his conduct will cause such a result.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
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ing the order may be unlawful would not be sufficient to satisfy
the standard.
The objective requirement turns out not to be as straightforward. On its face, it simply requires that the order be mani181
festly illegal to a person of common understanding. But it is
not exactly clear how to define “manifestly illegal” or “person of
common understanding.” As to the latter, what constitutes this
hypothetical person? Should a military soldier’s individualized
experience or training be included? What about a soldier’s rank
or age? Currently, the answer seems to be a bare-bones hypo182
thetical soldier with little to no individualization. But as evidenced by the dissent in Calley, there does seem to be some debate as to how much individualization should be included when
183
constructing this objective standard.
184
Scholars, too, have taken up this issue. Professor Mark
Osiel, for instance, questions the efficacy of the prevailing nonindividualized model. He recognizes that the test focuses on a
person of “common conscience of elementary humanity,” such
that the illegality of the act would be “universally known to
185
everybody.” However, he argues that such a general statement fails to take into account the individual “strengths and
186
weaknesses” of a particular defendant. He advocates instead
for incorporating some of the defendant’s characteristics before
187
applying the rule. This may help ameliorate a soldier’s competing duties of obeying orders on the one hand but disobeying
188
orders that are unlawful on the other.
This issue is not new. Courts and scholars have always
struggled with how individualized objective scrutiny should be
when it comes to defenses in the criminal law. For example,
significant ink has been spent on how individualized the objec181. See supra Part I.D and note 128.
182. See supra Part I.D and note 128. Military jury instructions support
this bare-bones approach. The Army model instructions, for instance, simply
ask for details about the terms of the order when discussing whether a person
of common understanding would have known the order to be illegal. MILITARY
JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, § 5-8-1.
183. See supra Part I.D.
184. See generally supra Part I.D.
185. Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the
Law of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 975 (1998) (quoting DINSTEIN, supra note
93, at 15).
186. Id. He finds that civilian law affords greater individualization than
military law. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1091.

2130

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2103

tive reasonable-person standard should be when it comes to
criminal defenses such as self-defense or heat of passion (e.g.,
to what extent gender, specific cultural beliefs, prior experi189
ence, and idiosyncratic characteristics should be included).
The more narrowly one defines the reasonable person or person
of common understanding as possessing the subjective qualities
of the defendant, the more likely the defendant will be success190
ful in raising the defense.

189. See, e.g., People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing impact of race-based experience in making objective determination of reasonable
person standard in self-defense); Commonwealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1990) (discussing whether provocation based on viewing homosexual lovemaking should be included in reasonable person standard when it
comes to heat-of-passion defense for murder); Joshua Dressler, When “Heterosexual” Men Kill “Homosexual” Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual
Advances, and the “Reasonable Man” Standard, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
726 (1995); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367 (1996) (discussing the
relevance of race-based beliefs in constructing the reasonable person standard
in self-defense cases); Robert L. Misner, The Awkward Case of Harry Gibson,
1986 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 691, 692–93 (discussing whether cultural beliefs should be
included in the reasonable person standard when it comes to heat-of-passion
defense for murder); Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting Over
the Subjectivity/Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33 (2008) (discussing the nature of the objective standard in self-defense); Robbin S. Ogle, Daniel Maier-Katkin & Thomas J. Bernard, A Theory of Homicidal Behavior
Among Women, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 173 (1995) (discussing how a “reasonable
woman” may react differently than a “reasonable man” when in the heat of
passion); Laurie J. Taylor, Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-ofPassion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1679,
1679–81 (1986) (discussing the implications of using gender in the reasonable
person standard for the heat-of-passion defense to murder given the finding
that women tend to respond to stressful situations by feeling guilt rather than
externalizing anger); see also Peter Westen, Individualizing the Reasonable
Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008) (discussing the extent
of the individualization of the reasonable person standard in criminal cases).
190. That said, a certain level of individualization over and above the basic
“reasonable person” standard could have the opposite effect. See Taylor, supra
note 189, at 167–81 (noting that if women in stressed situations are less likely
to externalize the anger through violence, a woman defendant raising a heatof-passion defense may not be as successful if the objective standard includes
gender). Similarly, with a more individualized definition of “person of common
understanding,” a solider may not be successful in raising an obedience to orders defense.
Imagine an experienced and high-ranked soldier who is given an unlawful
order to bomb a particular facility. Assuming she does not know it is unlawful,
it may turn out that a person of common understanding, without the relevant
experience or training, would not recognize the order to be unlawful. However,
a more individualized hypothetical high-ranking officer may have known the
order was unlawful, thus resulting in conviction.

2014]

ENTRAPPED

2131

Similar, and perhaps greater, issues arise with how to define palpable or manifest illegality. The focus is on whether a
191
solider would find the order illegal “at first blush.” One early
court decision puts it this way: an order is manifestly illegal if
it is “so palpably atrocious as well as illegal, that one must in192
stinctively feel that it ought not to be obeyed.” Likewise,
scholars have characterized it as a soldier’s “gut-level, unreasoning” and have focused on whether the order invokes “repug193
nance” or “moral opprobrium.” The standard seems easy to
apply when breaking the law has nothing to do with purported
military objectives. For instance, an order by a superior officer
194
to rape a person would obviously be manifestly illegal. The
same would be the case for an order to execute unarmed civil195
ians. These are easy cases for the standard, particularly because there is seemingly no military purpose for these acts.
But the analysis becomes more difficult when the act is arguably connected to military service. Osiel takes the example of
196
a soldier shooting prisoners. At first blush, this would seem
like an unlawful act that is manifestly illegal. But other considerations may bear on whether the soldier has committed a
crime. Perhaps military necessity would permit a small group
of soldiers, who are vulnerable and behind enemy lines, to kill
these individuals if they could not take them as prisoners of
197
war without jeopardizing an important mission. It is not clear
how the concept of manifest illegality would handle this type of
situation. Osiel finds that the principle’s bright-line rule fails to
account for the situational awareness of circumstances that
may make the same act unlawful in one context but not in the
198
other.
He goes on to argue that certain acts, while manifestly ille199
gal, may be necessary evils for achieving the greater good. He
uses the example of the Hiroshima bombing, which killed thou200
sands of innocent civilians. Would a soldier be punished for
following orders to drop the atom bomb? Under a strict reading
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867).
Id. at 1241.
Osiel, supra note 185, at 995.
See id. at 1003.
See discussion of Nuremberg Charter, supra Part I.C.
See Osiel, supra note 185, at 1003–05.
Id.
Id. at 971.
Id. at 989–90.
Id.
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of the manifest illegality principle, the answer seems to be yes.
Surely, such an act would be, “at first blush,” clearly illegal and
morally repugnant. But utilitarian principles suggest otherwise. Indeed, the conventional thinking was that such an act
would end the War early and save many more lives than it
201
took. Another consideration relates to the appropriate legal
perspective—international or national—from which the illegali202
ty standard should apply. Certain acts that are blanketly illegal under international law may not be illegal under national
203
law and vice versa.
These are interesting issues that merit further discussion.
To be sure, any account of this objective state-of-mind standard
must satisfactorily define what constitutes “manifest illegality”
and “person of common understanding.” However, these questions are ultimately beyond the scope of this article. The purpose here is not to debate how to define the prevailing model,
but to question why it is used in the first place. In fact, if the
manifest illegality principle is subject to such varying interpretations, one must ask why it is part of the defense and what
role it really serves.
B. THE UNIQUE CASE OF OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS
The first place to start is the rationale for the defense itself. An obedience to orders defense serves to balance competing interests. We want to make sure soldiers do not commit
crimes, but we also recognize that military life requires soldiers
to obey orders. As one early case notes, “implicit obedience
which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors . . . is indispensably necessary to every military system,”
but “the[se] instructions cannot . . . legalize an act which . . .
204
would have been a plain trespass.” Scholars also recognize
the balance that must be reached between these two ends. Pro201. Id. at 990. For a discussion of the justification for the bombing, see
WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, A DEMOCRACY AT WAR 420–26 (1993) and RONALD
SCHAFFER, WINGS OF JUDGMENT 131–38 (1985).
202. Osiel, supra note 185, at 981–85; see DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 32–
33 (noting that the uncertainty relating to international law pushes against
the effectiveness of a manifest illegality principle).
203. Osiel gives the example of attacking or bombing a medical facility.
Osiel, supra note 185, at 986–87. Under applicable international law, such destroying a legitimate medical facility is forbidden, but utilitarian considerations of military necessity may trump the international law and render such
destruction acceptable as collateral damage. Id.
204. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804).
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fessor Yoram Dinstein describes a soldier’s dilemma in this
way: by submitting to an illegal order, the solider “commits a
crime [and] violat[es] the prescriptions of criminal law,” but
should the solider “def[y] the order and abstain[] from commission of the crime,” he would violate the “dictates of military
205
law.” The manifest illegality principle seeks to assuage these
opposing concerns. James Insco describes this principle as a
“compromise that balances these competing aims by promoting
discipline in the military while not entirely subverting the su206
premacy of the law.” For this reason, the manifest illegality
principle presumptively favors obeying the order. The language
207
requires obedience unless the order is manifestly illegal. In
this way, “[t]he doctrine demands that the subordinate share
responsibility with his superior only for the clearest, most obvi208
ous crimes.”
But it is not clear why the standard requires subjective
good faith (whether the defendant knew the order was unlawful) along with objective scrutiny of this assessment (whether a
person of common understanding would have known the order
was unlawful). The early cases do not explain where the objective component comes from and why both requirements appropriately balance the competing interests of promoting discipline, on the one hand, and making sure no crime is committed,
on the other. Therefore, Osiel favors an objective standard that
209
is less bright-line-based than the manifest illegality principle.
He proposes a standard that is more context-based and focuses
on whether the particular soldier in the given circumstances
210
made a reasonable mistake in obeying an unlawful order.
205. DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 6–7.
206. Insco, supra note 6, at 393. Because of this, Insco describes the defense as “a sort of golden mean.” Id. Courts take a similar approach to the justification of the objective standard. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19,
32 (C.M.A. 1973) (“Casting the defense of obedience to orders solely in subjective terms of mens rea would operate practically to abrogate those objective
restraints which are essential to functioning rules of war.” (quoting United
States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1184 (C.M.A. 1973))).
207. See OSIEL, supra note 101 at 54–55; supra Part I.E.1 and note 128.
208. Osiel, supra note 185, at 963.
209. Id. at 1091–92.
210. Id. This approach begins with the stringent rule that all orders should
be obeyed. Id. This bright line would be qualified by an exception concerning
the soldier’s reasonable mistake as to the lawfulness of the order based on the
“factual configuration confronted by the errant soldier.” Id. Presumably, in assessing whether the error was reasonable, a court would also look at the soldier’s particular experience, training, and rank. Id. at 975 n.121.
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Dinstein, on the other hand, suggests that a subjective
standard standing alone would satisfy the competing concerns
211
of preventing crimes while fostering military obedience. Arguing that subjective knowledge is the key consideration here,
he finds that the objective standard’s role is simply that of a
“technical contrivance of the law of evidence, designed to ease
212
the burden of proof lying on the prosecution.” He finds that
the uncertainty of the provisions of international law further
213
frustrates the use of the objective standard. For this reason,
he advocates for a model that simply focuses on whether the de214
fendant knew the order was unlawful. The Model Penal Code
215
also supports a purely subjective model.
Interestingly, none of these accounts ground their proposed
framework on existing criminal law principles that support re216
jection of the dual state-of-mind requirements. Rather, they
simply argue that their respective approaches balance the competing interests involved, while avoiding the problems associat217
ed with the manifestly illegality standard. This Article goes
further by relying on the framework of an established de-

211. DINSTEIN, supra note 113. This type of model would be not unlike other parts of the criminal law where a jury would infer a subjective state of mind
from external evidence. See id. at 27–29. This type of model would alleviate
the issues surrounding the individualization of a “person of ordinary understanding” and the definition of “manifestly illegal.” Id. at 27.
212. See id. at 29. Dinstein’s criticism of the manifest illegality principle
appears to echo that of Calley’s dissent. Dinstein too finds that this principle
may be overinclusive and may result in the improper conviction of a solider
based on his particular situation. Id. at 27–29. He cites to a solider with a
subnormal IQ who may not realize an order is unlawful even though a person
of common understanding would recognize it as such. Id. at 27.
213. See supra note 202.
214. DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 30–32. Deemed the “personal knowledge
principle,” Dinstein finds that manifest illegality may still play an ancillary
role in his model in that if an order was manifestly illegal, the defendant is
presumed to have been aware of the illegality. Id.
215. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10 (1962) (“It is an affirmative defense
that the actor, in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense,
does no more than execute an order of his superior in the armed services that
he does not know to be unlawful.”). The rationale behind this subjective approach relates to soldiers being prosecuted in civilian jurisdictions where it is
not realistic for juries to understand what a soldier of common understanding
would have known. See id. § 2.10 cmt. 1, at 392.
216. Some scholars rely on the tort principle of respondeat superior in arguing that the superior officer alone should be held solely responsible for the
subordinate’s crime. See Nico Keijzer, A Plea for the Defence of Superior Orders, 8 ISR. Y.B. ON HUM. RTS. 78, 80–84 (1978).
217. See supra notes 212–15.
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fense—the entrapment defense—to support rejection of the current model.
The basic problem is that courts and scholars alike have
failed to accurately analogize obedience to orders to a comparable civilian criminal law defense. Most civilian criminal law defenses—e.g. self-defense, heat of passion, duress, necessity, and
mistake of law or fact—carry similar dual state-of-mind re218
quirements. This may explain why these requirements also
found their way into the obedience to orders defense. The dissent in Calley, for instance, in arguing for a specific objective
standard for obedience to orders, noted that objectively scrutinizing the defendant’s state of mind is commonly performed in
other areas of criminal law, citing specifically to the heat of
219
passion defense and the mistake of fact defense.
The obedience to orders defense has been specifically asso220
ciated with the civilian defenses of duress and mistake of law.
These two more than others have come to be seen as sharing
similar properties with the obedience to orders defense. But
this association is inapposite. Obedience to orders involves a
type of government coercion that is not present with either duress or mistake of law. The unique nature of the government’s
218. See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (noting that self-defense exonerates defendant only if she acted in good
faith and her belief was “objectively reasonable in light of the surrounding circumstances”); Nelson v. State, 597 P.2d 977, 979 (Alaska 1979) (finding that
necessity requires subjective belief in preventing the greater evil and that the
belief was reasonable to a person in the defendant’s situation); People v. Navarro, 99 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 11 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1979) (finding
that mistake of fact in general intent crimes require subjective good faith and
objective reasonableness); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991)
(noting that the heat-of-passion defense requires that the defendant committed homicide in sudden heat of passion and provocation was “calculated to inflame the passion of a reasonable man” (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); infra Parts III.A.1 (duress requirements), III.B.1 (mistake of
law requirements). It is important to note that with obedience to orders, unlike the bulk of these defenses, the ultimate burden of persuasion still rests
with the government. See United States v. New, 55 M.J. 95, 113–14 (C.A.A.F.
2001) (noting the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defense of obedience to orders did not exist); MILITARY JUDGES’
BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, § 5-8-1; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012,
supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(b)(1).
219. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 31–32 (C.M.A. 1973)
(Darden, C.J., dissenting). The dissent agrees that while objective scrutiny is
necessary, much like in other parts of criminal law, the standard must be
more relaxed than the prevailing standard of common understanding. See supra Part I.E.1 (providing an extensive overview of the dissent in Calley).
220. See infra Parts III.A–B.
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role in obedience to orders undercuts the rationale that supports the use of a dual state-of-mind requirement for these other defenses. The following sections expand on this argument in
order to show why these two defenses should not serve as the
relevant civilian analogs to obedience to orders.
III. COMPARING OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS WITH DURESS
AND MISTAKE OF LAW: THE LACK OF GOVERNMENT
COERCION
Part III explains why duress and mistake of law should not
serve as the relevant civilian analogs. It focuses on the fact that
both these defenses lack the kind of government coercion present in the obedience to orders defense. This Part explores the
duress defense and contrasts the private coercion present there
with the public coercion found in obedience to orders. Next, it
discusses mistake of law and highlights how this defense, unlike obedience to orders, does not implicate any government influence or pressure.
A. DURESS
1. The Role of Objective Scrutiny
The early cases of duress primarily involved claims of coer221
cion in contractual disputes. In one notable case, the Supreme Court defined duress as “that degree of constraint or
danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending,
which is sufficient, in severity or in apprehension, to overcome
222
the mind and will of a person of ordinary firmness.” In another, it defined the term as “moral compulsion, such as that pro223
duced by threats to take life or inflict great bodily harm.”
These early cases foreshadowed the dual state-of-mind requirements for the use of duress to excuse criminal conduct
based on specific threats. The typical definition of duress requires the following elements: “(1) an immediate threat of
death or serious bodily injury, (2) a well-grounded fear that the
threat will be carried out, and (3) lack of a reasonable oppor-

221. See, e.g., Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43, 44 (1926);
Baker v. Morton, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 150, 151–52 (1870); Brown v. Pierce, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 205, 214 (1868).
222. Brown, 74 U.S. at 214.
223. Morton, 79 U.S. at 158.
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tunity to escape the threatened harm.” Successful application
of the duress defense to a crime requires both a subjective state
of mind and some level of objective scrutiny. The defendant
must in good faith believe he is being threatened to commit the
crime, and a reasonable person in the defendant’s situation also
225
must have been similarly coerced. It is important to note that
the defendant typically satisfies the mens rea of the crime and
226
thus knows what he is doing is unlawful. However, the defendant is not criminally responsible assuming the threats sufficiently overpower him. The Model Penal Code and the states
that follow it talk about this in the context of a defendant being
“coerced in circumstances under which a person of reasonable
firmness in [the] situation would likewise have been unable to
227
resist.” As another court states, “[a] defendant’s [subjective]
fear of death or serious bodily injury is generally insufficient.
Rather, ‘[t]here must be evidence that the threatened harm was
228
present, immediate, or impending.’” Jury instructions follow
this two-part test, requiring that “[t]he defendant engaged in
the criminal conduct because he was coerced to do so” and that
“the degree of force used or the degree of threatened use of
force, was such that a person of reasonable firmness in the de229
fendant’s situation would not have been able to resist it.” The
224. United States v. Vasquez-Landaver, 527 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2008);
see also United States v. Sawyer, 558 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2009). The Model
Penal Code requires similar elements:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) (1985). Many states follow the Model Penal
Code definition and thus require that a reasonable person in the defendant’s
shoes would have also not resisted. See id. § 2.09 cmt. 4, at 384 n.60 (collecting
state statutes).
225. A defendant would not satisfy the subjective portion if, for instance,
she committed the crime after receiving threats that she knew were baseless
or otherwise not coercive. Perhaps, she wanted to commit the crime for other
reasons but waited until receiving such veiled threats. Here, she was not actually coerced.
226. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 492 (4th ed. 2003);
Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and
Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1359–60 (1989).
227. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 explanatory note at 367.
228. Sawyer, 558 F.3d at 711; PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 7TH CIRCUIT
§ 6.08 committee cmt. (2013).
229. 5 CONNECTICUT PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 6.5 (4th ed. 2007).
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military defense of duress tracks the same requirements as the
civilian version, including objectively scrutinizing the defend230
ant’s actions.
Both courts and scholars have found that the purpose of
this objective scrutiny is to set uniform standards for all citizens. The Model Penal Code commentary justifies it along the
following lines:
The crucial reason [for rejecting a wholly subjective approach to duress] is the same as that which elsewhere leads to an unwillingness to
vary legal norms with the individual’s capacity to meet the standards
they prescribe . . . . To make liability depend upon the fortitude of any
given actor would be no less impractical or otherwise impolitic than to
permit it to depend upon such other variables as intelligence or clari231
ty of judgment, suggestibility or moral insight.

The point here is that all individuals should be held to a
certain societal norm notwithstanding a person’s idiosyncratic
232
traits. The Code mentions the situation of a defendant who is
233
easily intimidated and therefore cannot control her conduct.
In rejecting the duress defense here, the Code finds that “legal
norms and sanctions operate not only at the moment of climactic choice, but also in the fashioning of values and of charac234
ter.” Courts similarly have focused on the promotion of community standards as a reason to continue employing objective
235
scrutiny.
Scholars, too, have recognized the importance of holding
everyone to the same standard. Professor Laurie Doré finds
that “the normative component of duress excuses only those actors who demonstrate the level of fortitude that society can fair230. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(h)
(“It is a defense to any offense except killing an innocent person that the accused’s participation in the offense was caused by a reasonable apprehension
that the accused or another innocent person would be immediately killed or
would immediately suffer serious bodily injury if the accused did not commit
the act. The apprehension must reasonably continue throughout the commission of the act.”).
231. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374.
232. The Code, however, does take into account the defendant’s physical
characteristics: “Stark, tangible factors that differentiate the actor from another, like his size, strength, age, or health, would be considered in making the
exculpatory judgment. [However,] [m]atters of temperament would not.”
Id.§ 2.09 cmt. 3, at 375.
233. Id. § 2.09 cmt. 2, at 374–75.
234. Id. The Code explicitly allows consideration of a “mental disease or
defect” that is “both gross and verifiable.” Id.
235. See, e.g., State v. Heinemann, 920 A.2d 278, 287–89 (Conn. 2007);
State v. B.H., 870 A.2d 273, 286 (N.J. 2005).
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ly expect of its morally responsible members . . . . regardless of
236
[their] own capacities or constitutional weaknesses.” Professor Joshua Dressler takes a softer approach. While he recognizes that a defendant under duress may not be infallible, he nevertheless concludes that it is acceptable for society to “set
reasonable, minimal standards of personal responsibility
(standards to which, lest we forget, we are willing to be held
ourselves), codify them in our criminal codes, and punish those
237
who fail to live up to them.”
2. Obedience to Orders as a Defense of Duress
Obedience to orders and duress share similar qualities.
Both defenses involve a third party exerting pressure or coercion on a defendant to commit a crime. The level of pressure
obviously is different. In one, the coercion takes the form of
imminent bodily harm or injury. In the other, the threat is implied and takes the form of criminal punishment. If a solider
fails to obey a superior order, she can be criminally prosecut238
ed. It may be an obvious point, but superior officers typically
do not explicitly convey the threat of prosecution. Rather, soldiers are indoctrinated to obey orders as part of their military
239
training. Evidence in fact suggests that soldiers get very little
instruction on the obedience to orders defense and the standard

236. Laurie Kratky Doré, Downward Adjustment and the Slippery Slope:
The Use of Duress in Defense of Battered Offenders, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 665, 748
(1995). Similar reasoning applies to other defenses where objective scrutiny is
required. See, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic But Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 4–5 (1998)
(noting that the reasonable person standard in self-defense and heat-ofpassion cases is intended to hold all citizens to the same standard).
237. Dressler, supra note 226, at 1370.
238. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at art. 90(2)
(“[A] [soldier who] willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commissioned officer; shall be punished, if the offense is committed in time of war,
by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct, and if the
offense is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death,
as a court-martial may direct.”). This type of coercion would still be different
than traditional duress since the threat of death is not “imminent.” See supra
note 224 and accompanying text.
239. See Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders:
The Mens Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55, 61 (1989) (“[A] soldier’s
training will very largely consist of a process designed to inculcate within him
habits of obedience to command.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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240

that courts use to judge their actions. The end result is a sys241
tem where soldiers are generally expected to obey all orders.
For this reason, courts naturally seem to characterize obedience to orders as a type of coercion. They talk about the “implicit obedience” or “general duty” associated with superior or242
ders. For instance, one court explained that “[t]he first duty
of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither
243
discipline nor efficiency in an army.” Pointing out the value of
reflexive obedience, the court stated that “[i]f every subordinate . . . soldier were at liberty to question the legality of the
orders of the commander, and obey them or not as they may
consider them valid or invalid . . . the precious moment for action would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates
244
of conflicting opinions.”
Scholars have also come to associate obedience to orders
with a type of duress. Insco finds that “the defense of superior
orders . . . embodies the principles underlying the defense[] of
245
compulsion.” Much like a case of duress, the “soldier must
make a choice of evils, deciding whether to follow an order,
which if illegal will subject him to liability, or to defy the order,
which if legal will subject the soldier to liability for insubordi246
nation.” Dinstein explains that the “factor of compulsion” in
240. Osiel notes that:
It may also be possible to induce disobedience to a still wider range of
unlawful orders by not informing the soldier that reasonable belief in
their legality will excuse his compliance. Training material issued to
American soldiers during Operation Desert Storm did just this, describing their legal duties as more demanding than they actually
were. The superior orders defense went unmentioned, as if it did not
exist; and soldiers were expressly instructed: “Orders Are Not a Defense.”
Osiel, supra note 185, at 1096.
241. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 51 (“Military discipline is very
strict, and it threatens insubordination with inexorable sanctions, so that the
soldier has practically no alternative (especially, though not necessarily, in
times of war) . . . .”). But see Bakker, supra note 239, at 62 (“Officials are expected to ask questions of their superiors, and to be morally and legally responsible for their own actions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
242. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (“[I]mplicit
obedience which military men usually pay to the orders of their superiors . . .
is indispensably necessary to every military system . . . .”); see also United
States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 28 (C.M.A. 1973).
243. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 28 (quoting McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235,
1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)).
244. Id.
245. Insco, supra note 6, at 396.
246. Id. at 396. But see Bakker, supra note 239, at 62 (“[T]he fact that or-
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an obedience to orders defense can be analogized to the com247
pulsion in a defense of duress. Others have made similar
248
comparisons.
This may explain the reason why obedience to orders also
carries an objective requirement similar to its duress counter249
part. Nevertheless, there is a critical difference between the
two that goes beyond simply the nature of the coercion involved—i.e., physical threats or threat of criminal sanction. The
source of the coercion is uniquely different. The government
plays a key role in pressuring a solider to obey an unlawful order, whereas in the duress scenario, it generally plays no such
role in pressuring a defendant to accede to an individual’s
threats.
The interaction in the duress case is completely between
250
private citizens. There is no government control or interest.
As far as the government is concerned, a citizen remains free to
disregard the threat and not commit the crime. Doing so will
not result in any criminal sanction or be otherwise deleterious
to a government objective. Of course, the individual may be
harmed as a result, but this does not implicate the government
in the same way. The government no doubt has a general interest in citizens being safe from harm, but a case of duress does
not implicate specific or targeted government interests as in
the military situation, where the government is the source of
the coercion. Objectively scrutinizing the defendant’s state of
mind on the back end makes sense in a duress case. As discussed above, the point of this objective test is that citizens
ders are sometimes attended with compulsion does not mean that every case
of obedience to orders is invariably accompanied by compulsion.”).
247. See DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 77.
248. See, e.g., Valerie Epps, The Soldier’s Obligation to Die When Ordered
to Shoot Civilians or Face Death Himself, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 987 (2003)
(analyzing the similarities between a soldier’s duty to obey orders and duress);
Green, supra note 177, at 330–31, 340.
249. The level of objective scrutiny is different. Duress takes the perspective of a “reasonable person,” whereas obedience to orders relies on the lower
standard of “a man of ordinary sense and understanding.” Compare Calley, 48
C.M.R. at 27–28, with supra notes 224–29, 231–37 and accompanying text.
This may be explained by the countervailing concern that soldiers typically
should obey orders. Having a higher standard here, like that of a “reasonable
person,” could lead to greater liability for soldiers who are on the lower end of
the scale or create less respect for obeying orders. Cf. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 28
(quoting McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867)).
250. The same would apply to other civilian affirmative defenses mentioned earlier (e.g. self-defense and heat-of-passion). The external pressure in
all of these situations is coming from a private citizen.
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should all be placed on equal footing if they end up succumbing
to a private threat of duress and committing a crime. The government cannot realistically keep people from threatening others. Uniformity during the trial stage, then, at least prevents
the government from unfairly discriminating in favor of certain
individuals because of their specific, idiosyncratic traits. In addition to providing consistent criminal verdicts, the objective
standard also serves an important socializing function intended
to regulate the outer limits of citizens’ behavior.
This rationale of promoting a uniform standard among soldiers—and thus the requirement of objective scrutiny—appears
problematic in the obedience to orders case. We are not talking
about behavior among private citizens, where all we can hope
for is some uniformity after the fact. The government created
the military command structure in which the subordinate finds
herself, as well as the criminal sanctions for disobedience to an
251
order. Thus, through the actions of a commanding officer, the
government is responsible for the pressure that leads a solider
252
to follow an unlawful order and commit a crime. To be sure,
without the threat of criminal sanction, the order would not
have the same coercive effect. Why, then, should a solider be
subject to additional objective scrutiny targeting her state of
mind—and an objective requirement which she may not be able
to satisfy—when the same government prosecuting her is also
responsible for the coercion? She should not. After all, the soldier is performing a vital function for the government by serving in its military. The role of government pressure in the
crime and the resultant standard by which a defendant should
be judged will be explained more fully in Part IV, discussing
entrapment. For now, it is enough to say that where the pressure stems from the inherent authority of the order, any objective consideration should take into account and focus on the
government’s responsibility in this criminal act, not on what a
person of common understanding would or would not have
known.
One may push back at this and say that the current objective requirement, as in the duress case, serves an important
251. See generally supra Parts I.A, I.D and accompanying notes.
252. Cf. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (noting that in the civil context, acts of government employees may
violate the Eighth Amendment or the government’s duty not to impose cruel
and unusual punishments); supra Part I.E (overviewing modern obedience to
order cases).
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normalizing function in the military. Holding soldiers to a uniform standard helps foster the correct behavior when a subordinate is ultimately confronted with an unlawful order. This
may be true, but if the duress-based rationale for objective
scrutiny should apply in the military context, it follows that the
specific objective requirement itself should also track its duress
counterpart. It currently does not. Duress focuses on whether a
reasonable person would have been unable to resist the threat,
whereas the law of obedience to orders focuses on whether a
soldier of common understanding would have known the order
253
was unlawful. These are two very different questions. The
first relates to how an individual is expected to behave, whereas the second relates to what a soldier is expected to know. In
fact, a successful application of duress is consistent with a defendant knowing that her action constitutes a crime. The point
of promulgating uniform behavior in this context is to make
sure individuals act reasonably when confronted with similar
coercive situations, even if they would know the act is wrongful.
Those that liken duress to obedience to orders focus on the
254
coercive nature of the threat or order. But if this defense indeed is the natural civilian analog, then the operative question
in the obedience to order case must be changed to address the
nature of the coercion and a soldier’s ability to resist, not
whether a soldier should have known about the unlawfulness of
the order. Otherwise, what is the relevance of the pressure being placed on the soldier? Knowledge of the lawfulness of an
order seems disconnected from the coercive nature of the or255
der. The basic problem in extending the same inquiry is that

253. The Model Penal Code and the states that follow it clearly ask whether a reasonable person would have also succumbed to the pressure. See supra
notes 224, 227. The aforementioned federal version and military versions essentially makes the same inquiry, albeit indirectly. The federal rule asks
whether the belief that the threat would be carried out was reasonable and a
reasonable person could have escaped or otherwise thwarted the threat. See
supra Part III.A.1 and accompanying notes. Similarly, the military rule asks
whether the defendant’s act was caused by a reasonable belief that the threat
was real. See supra note 230. When the elements of these respective defenses
are combined, the relevant inquiry becomes whether a reasonable person
would also have succumbed to the threats or, put slightly differently, whether
the defendant otherwise acted reasonably. Either way, the focus is on the defendant’s actions, not her knowledge of the criminal nature of the act.
254. See supra Part II.B.
255. Perhaps the thinking here is that if a soldier knows the order is unlawful, she will not follow it. First, this does not necessarily follow given a military setting, but, more importantly, any inquiry into knowledge of an order
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soldiers typically have to follow orders, whereas duress defendants are not obligated to succumb to threats. The reason for the
difference of course centers on the fact that the government
promulgates the order in the first situation but not the threats
in the second. This only underscores the conclusion that the
government’s role must be accounted for when fashioning the
obedience to orders defense. Interestingly, the entrapmentbased objective test more appropriately focuses on what a defendant would have done, not what the defendant should have
known. In its current form, obedience to orders cannot be accurately analogized to the doctrine of duress and its underlying
256
rationale.
None of this changes how we would analyze the defense of
duress in the military. Take the case of a soldier who threatens
a subordinate with bodily harm or death unless the individual
commits a criminal act. Here, the coercion comes from the private threat of bodily harm instead of the inherent pressure of a
257
Because
superior order (promulgated by the government).
there is no government-sanctioned pressure, the defendant
would simply rely on the conventional duress defense. This
would look very similar to the civilian analysis described earlier. A successful application of duress in this instance would require some level of objective scrutiny as to the legitimacy of the
fails to account for the coercion experienced by the soldier, the very factor that
underlies an application of duress.
256. One might argue that obedience to orders should thus be changed to
more closely resemble duress, as an alternative to this Article’s realignment to
entrapment. However, this option would require further changes to the obedience to orders defense. To mirror duress’s subjective element, the subjective
portion of the obedience to orders defense would have to be changed to ask
whether a soldier in good faith followed the order, instead of asking whether
the solider knew the order was unlawful. Compare supra Part III.A.1, with
supra note 225. This may be problematic in execution, because unlike the coercion facing a duress defendant, soldiers must obey orders. This means the
soldier would almost always satisfy the subjective or good faith portion of the
defense.
More generally, if we have decided to go ahead and change the obedience
to orders defense, it behooves us to ask if there is a better civilian analog that
more closely parallels this military defense. This Article argues that entrapment should stand as the civilian equivalent. Because even if as a practical
matter the revised objective portion of the defense would be similar to either
duress or entrapment, using the latter fully appreciates the government’s role
in the crime. See infra Part IV.B.
257. See, e.g., MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179 (noting that
the obedience to orders defense does not exist if the jury finds beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant “was not acting under orders” when committing
the crime).
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threat. We do not want a different standard by which some soldiers are absolved from liability based on such private threats.
B. MISTAKE OF LAW
1. The Role of Objective Scrutiny
Mistake of law historically has not served as a defense to
258
criminal conduct. Individuals are presumed to know the crim259
inal law, and so ignorance of the specific law is no excuse.
The rationale is primarily utilitarian and pragmatic. Not allowing this type of defense deters criminal conduct, fosters orderly
260
administration, and preserves the primacy of the rule of law.
This absolute prohibition has weakened over time, particularly
261
as a result of the proliferation of criminal statutes. Today,
courts allow a mistake of law defense in limited circumstances.
The Model Penal Code, for instance, provides a typical formulation:
A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct
when . . . [the accused] acts in reasonable reliance [on] an official
statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision . . . ; (iii) an administrative order . . . ; or (iv) an official interpre-

258. See, e.g., United States v. Tobin, 480 F.3d 53, 59 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 850 (11th Cir. 2007); Howell v. State, 618 So.
2d 134, 142 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992); Kipp v. State, 704 A.2d 839, 842 (Del.
1998); United States v. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d 1068, 1068 (N.Y. 1987); Bruce R.
Grace, Ignorance of the Law as an Excuse, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1392, 1395
(1986) (“The refusal to allow mistakes of criminal law as a defense is due to a
strong common law presumption that every person knows the criminal law.”).
259. See Edwin Meese III & Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reconsidering the Mistake
of Law Defense, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 725, 738 (2012) (“The first and
oldest justification is that ignorance or mistake of the law cannot be an excuse
since every person is presumed to know the law.”).
260. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1080; Meese, supra note 259, at 749 (discussing the rationales for this rule to include the effective administration of justice
as well as the promotion of deterrence).
261. See Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1074 (“Today there is widespread criticism
of the common-law rule mandating categorical preclusion of the mistake of law
defense.” (citing scholars and cases)); Grace, supra note 258, at 1395–96 (noting that the presumption of knowledge of criminal law made sense in the past
when the “common law of crimes closely tracked a relatively homogeneous
community’s moral sensibility,” but in light of the increase of regulatory
crimes, this presumption is “largely fictional”); Meese, supra note 259, at 729–
37 (finding that because of today’s criminal structure, including relevant procedures and substantive crimes, the rationale for no mistake of law defense
has been significantly reduced).
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tation [by the] . . . body charged by law with responsibility for the in262
terpretation . . . .
263

Courts have adopted similar requirements. In a paradigmatic case, a defendant, for instance, could make out a mistake of law defense to a crime if she relied on an official statement issued by a state Attorney General interpreting a
264
relevant criminal provision. The defense requires both subjective and objective scrutiny, similar to the requirements of
duress. The defendant must have actually relied on the information in good faith, and the reliance must have been “reason265
able.” Reasonableness typically means that “a person sincerely desirous of obeying the law would have accepted the

262. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04(3)(b) (1985). The Code also allows the defense where the particular statute is not known to the actor or otherwise not
reasonably made available. See id. § 2.04(3)(a). A mistake of law defense is also known as estoppel by entrapment, not to be confused with traditional entrapment as discussed in Part IV. See Commonwealth v. Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d
609, 619 (Mass. 1993) (reasonable reliance on a statute or official statement
creates a defense known as “entrapment by estoppel”); John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 3
(1997) (noting that “entrapment by estoppel” signifies reasonable reliance on
official interpretation of law). A typical rationale for this defense centers on
the defendant’s reduced culpability because of her reliance on a government’s
erroneous interpretation of the law. See SueAnn D. Billimack, Reliance on an
Official Interpretation of the Law: The Defense’s Appropriate Dimensions, 1993
U. ILL. L. REV. 565, 577.
263. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 83 (2d Cir. 1984); United
States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947–48 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Clark v. State, 739
P.2d 777, 779 (Alaska App. 1987); Gallegos v. State, 828 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex.
App. 1992). The military has a similar mistake of law defense in limited circumstances. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at
R.C.M. 916(l), Discussion (“[M]istake of law may be a defense when the mistake results from reliance on the decision or pronouncement of an authorized
public official or agency. For example, if an accused, acting on the advice of an
official responsible for administering benefits that the accused is entitled to
those benefits, applies for and receives those benefits, the accused may have a
defense even though the accused was not legally eligible for the benefits.”).
264. See, e.g., Twitchell, 617 N.E.2d at 612–13 (finding that in a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter for improper care of a child on account of
spiritual healing, parents could rely on attorney general opinion interpreting
relevant criminal law).
265. See, e.g., United States v. West Indies Transp., Inc., 127 F.3d 299, 313
(3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1985)
(noting that a good-faith misunderstanding of law as a defense depends on objective reasonableness); Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1080–81; State v. Patten, 353
N.W.2d 30, 33 (N.D. 1984) (holding that even if defendant subjectively relied
on sheriff’s office and a county state’s attorney statement, the defendant’s alleged reliance on such official statements, for the purposes of asserting a mistake-of-law defense, was clearly unreasonable).
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information as true, and would not have been put on notice to
266
make further inquiries.”
Scholars and courts provide two interconnected reasons for
this reasonableness standard or objective verification. First, it
is important that there be some objective boundaries so that
the defense is not dependent on mistaken beliefs of specific individuals. As Professor Miriam Gur-Arye puts it, “The boundaries ought to be defined by statute and to be interpreted by a
body empowered to interpret the law . . . [and] should not be influenced by the mistaken views of each and every individual as
267
to the scope of the prohibition.” This rationale is similar to
the rationale for the objective standard in duress. There, too,
the point is to prevent idiosyncratic verdicts while promoting a
single community standard. The second justification encourages knowledge of the law and accurate readings of the statute.
“Granting a defense to a person who relies on a mistaken opinion of an official body . . . helps to promote knowledge of the
268
criminal law . . . .” It motivates a person to seek guidance on
269
verification of the law. Bruce Grace makes the same point,
but in the negative. If subjective belief alone were relevant,
“[t]his could create an incentive for a potential defendant to

266. United States v. Lansing, 424 F.2d 225, 227 (9th Cir. 1970); see also
United States v. Abcasis, 45 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Nichols, 21 F.3d 1016, 1018 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that a belief must be reasonable “in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law misrepresented, and
the substance of the misrepresentation”).
267. Miriam Gur-Arye, Reliance on a Lawyer’s Mistaken Advice—Should it
be an Excuse From Criminal Liability?, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 455, 458 (2002);
JEROME HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 394, 382–83 (2d ed.
1960) (“If that plea [mistake of law] were valid, the consequence would be:
whenever a defendant in a criminal case thought the law was thus and so, he
is to be treated as though the law were thus and so, i.e. the law actually is thus
and so. But such a doctrine would contradict the essential requisites of a legal
system.”); see also Bressler, 772 F.2d at 291 n.2 (providing an objective reasonableness instruction helps jury to distinguish good-faith belief from disagreement); Francis Funaro, Tax Law—Assessing Willfulness in Criminal Tax Cases: Supreme Court Rejects Objective Reasonableness Standard—Cheek v.
United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 904, 908 (1991).
268. Gur-Arye, supra note 267, at 461; United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d
102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987) (limiting the defense to objectively reasonable beliefs
encourages individual to learn law); cf. Marrero, 507 N.E.2d at 1069 (finding
that the reason for denying mistake of law defense was the Holmesian utility
of knowledge principle where individuals should be encouraged to obey the
law).
269. Gur-Arye, supra note 267, at 461.
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turn a blind eye to the probability of regulation in order to per270
fect a mistake of law defense.”
2. Obedience to Orders as Mistake of Law Defense
Mistake of law and obedience to orders both deal with reliance on an authoritative interpretation of the law authored by
the government. In the one, it may take the form of a judicial
opinion, administrative order, or law enforcement decision. In
the other, it takes the form of a military order—a pronouncement cloaked with the authority of the government. Much like
the civilian who trusts the determination of the state attorney
general, the subordinate soldier trusts the determination of a
commanding officer. Both these individuals derive their authority to give such statements from the government. This is why
courts may excuse certain criminal conduct under these cir271
cumstances. The defendant is relying on the same government that is doing the prosecuting.
For this reason, scholars have come to view obedience to
orders as a version of a mistake of law defense. As Insco writes,
“Within the framework of an obedience to orders defense, a soldier probably should be able to take refuge in the principles of a
272
mistake of law claim . . . .” He gives the example of a commanding officer who gives an illegal order to fire on a museum.
A subordinate soldier following this order accepts (albeit incorrectly) the commanding officer’s assessment that this is a law273
ful target. Arguably, the reliance here is no different than a
mistaken reliance on a state attorney general’s official interpretation. Put another way, by asserting an obedience to orders defense, a soldier asserts that “he carried out an illegal order
274
while mistaken as to the law involved.” Other scholars have
275
made similar comparisons.
270. Grace, supra note 258, at 1416.
271. It is important to note that, however, similar to civilian courts, military law finds that ignorance of the law is typically not an excuse. MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(l).
272. See Insco, supra note 6, at 395.
273. Id. Of course, under the obedience to orders defense, the soldier will
not escape liability if the unlawfulness of the order to burn the museum was
manifestly illegal.
274. See Solis, supra note 80, at 522.
275. See, e.g., DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 76–77; Hiromi Sato, Mistake of
Law Within and Outside the International Criminal Court, 15 TOURO INT’L L.
REV. 138, 158 (2012). Dinstein also explicitly points out how obedience to orders shares qualities of both duress and mistake of law. See DINSTEIN, supra
note 113, at 56–57.
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There is indeed a natural nexus between obedience to orders and mistake of law. The element of government authority
found in both cases is something not present in the duress defense. There, the relevant players are private citizens with no
connection to the government. For this reason, one might even
more closely associate obedience to orders with mistake of law
276
than with duress. But here, too, there is a critical difference.
There is no coercion in mistake of law cases. A defendant simply relies on an official interpretation and decides on her own to
277
take the relevant course of conduct. The action is entirely discretionary. A defendant, for instance, may seek an interpretation from the attorney general’s office in connection with performance of some potentially illegal activity. But the defendant
278
is not required by the government to take the action.
Objective scrutiny makes sense in the mistake of law context. As discussed above, it promotes uniformity of standards.
As in the case of duress, the successful application of the mistake of law defense should not depend on the idiosyncratic,
mistaken beliefs of citizens. It is important to promulgate a
consistent community standard with respect to reliance on a
government agency’s recommendation. The same goes for promoting knowledge of the law. With an objective requirement,
citizens are encouraged to make sure they properly investigate

276. The relevant inquiry in mistake of law also more closely tracks the
inquiry in obedience to orders. Both mistake of law and obedience to orders
focus on the defendant’s state of mind and the reasonableness of the belief,
whereas duress focuses on the defendant’s actions and whether these actions
are reasonable.
277. This type of reliance on official authority was central in the Oliver
North case. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
OSIEL, supra note 101, at 301 n.19 (“Oliver North defended his conduct on the
basis of a Model Penal Code provision applicable to civilians who reasonably
rely on statements of their legal duties by official authorities.”).
278. Another area that has prompted discussions of the mistake of law defense involves actions by non-military government officials in connection with
the detention and interrogation of terror suspects. See generally John Sifton,
United States Military and Central Intelligence Agency Personnel Abroad:
Plugging the Prosecutorial Gaps, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 487 (2006). While no
such non-military government agent has been prosecuted, they could argue
that they reasonably relied on the Office of Legal Counsel’s memos on the subject. See id. at 513–14. It is not clear to what extent the arguments in this Article would apply here. These agents presumably would not have been ordered
to use these alleged torture techniques with threat of criminal sanction as in
the obedience to orders case. That said, perhaps these individuals would have
been threatened by demotion or termination, suggesting a reworking similar
to the instant analysis.
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and read the official interpretation before acting in accordance
with it.
Objective scrutiny, however, does not make sense in the
obedience to orders case. A soldier does not merely rely, at her
own discretion, on an official interpretation of the law issued by
her commanding officer. The soldier is required to obey the
command. This government-sanctioned coercion has to be accounted for when holding a soldier liable for committing a
crime under these circumstances. The basic point here tracks
279
the earlier discussion of duress and obedience to orders. Soldiers should not be held to a uniform standard when the very
government doing the prosecuting is the one coercing them to
280
commit the crime.
The promotion of knowledge of the law as a separate justification for the requirement of objective scrutiny also does not
make sense in the military context. The very nature of military
281
structure and necessity requires obedience, not investigation.
To be sure, a culture where soldiers routinely question the lawfulness of superior orders would be deleterious to military effectiveness. This is not to suggest that soldiers are merely robots
282
following orders blindly. Asking for advice and clarification
has its place. But the role of questioning is obviously more limited and circumscribed, and understandably so, in the military
context than in civilian life.

279. See supra Part III.A.2.
280. Dinstein appears to discount the coercion that distinguishes mistake
of law from obedience to orders. DINSTEIN, supra note 113, at 34–36. He finds
no real difference between a soldier receiving an order from a commanding officer and one receiving advice from a military lawyer. Both, according to him,
fall within the rubric of mistake of law. Id. at 35. While the association between the two cannot be denied, there is a difference between being ordered to
do something as opposed to simply relying on advice at one’s discretion. Part
IV will more closely address the relevance of objective considerations when
confronted with government pressure.
281. See OSIEL, supra note 101, at 289; supra Part III.A.2 and related
notes.
282. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 26 (C.M.A.1973) (“[T]he
obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person.”); Osiel,
supra note 185, at 1070 (“Informed by military sociology, sophisticated military managers increasingly prefer the initiative of the self-starter to the
blind obedience of the automaton.”).
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IV. REALIGNING OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS WITH
ENTRAPMENT
Part IV explores the similarities between entrapment and
obedience to orders and argues that both should share the same
requirements. This Part first details the history of entrapment
and the contours of the subjective and objective tests, along
with scholars’ reactions to them. It next highlights the similarities between the two defenses and explains what a reoriented
obedience to orders defense would look like. Finally, it provides
a real-world hypothetical military scenario that applies the
reconceptualized defense.
A. CONTOURS OF THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
The history of the entrapment defense represents two competing interests: making sure the government has the ability to
ferret out criminal activity and preventing the government
from coercing or unlawfully pressuring otherwise innocent citi283
zens to commit crimes. The early American cases did not rec284
ognize any defense based on police inducement. If a citizen
committed a crime, regardless of the role of government, she
285
was guilty of the crime. Shortly after the turn of the century,
courts became increasingly frustrated with government286
induced crimes committed by citizens. They criticized government agents, albeit in dicta, for their overreaching tactics
287
and encouragements.
Federal courts similarly began to emphasize the unfairness
288
of punishing government-induced crimes. Woo Wai v. United
283. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 2, at 408 (1985) (“Particularly in
the enforcement of laws against vice, such as liquor and narcotics laws, it is all
but impossible to obtain evidence for prosecution save by the use of decoys.”);
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 210–11; cf. Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206,
210 & n.6 (1966) (acknowledging the importance of decoys in ferreting out covert criminal dealings).
284. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 218–19 and accompanying notes for
cases rejecting the defense.
285. See, e.g., Bd. of Comm’rs v. Backus, 29 How. Pr. 33, 42 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1864) (finding that the plea of entrapment “has never since availed to shield
crime or give indemnity to the culprit, and it is safe to say that under any code
of civilized, not to say christian [sic] ethics, it never will.”).
286. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 219 and accompanying notes.
287. See id. at 220–21 and accompanying notes for cited cases; Scott C. Paton, “The Government Made Me Do It”: A Proposed Approach to Entrapment
Under Jacobson v. United States, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 995, 997 (1994).
288. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 220–21 and accompanying notes for
cited cases.
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States became the first case to allow entrapment as a complete
289
defense to the commission of a crime. The defendants were
charged with conspiring to unlawfully bring certain foreign na290
tionals into the country. The Ninth Circuit overturned their
convictions, finding that the evidence adduced at trial involved
significant government encouragement or inducement to com291
mit the crime. Specifically, the court noted that undercover
agents prodded defendants on numerous occasions over a twoyear period before the defendants finally assented to the crimi292
nal scheme.
In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on the mental
state of the defendants. It found that prior to the government
involvement, the defendants had never engaged in this type of
illegal importation or “thought of committing any offense
293
against immigration laws.” Rather, with “the case at bar, the
suggestion of the criminal act came from the officers of the gov294
ernment.” Obtaining a conviction under these circumstances,
295
according to the court, was against public policy. This decision led to a number of other federal cases involving claims of
296
entrapment.
It was not until Sorrells v. United States, almost twenty
years later, that the Supreme Court issued an authoritative
297
statement on the entrapment defense. The case involved a
defendant who was convicted of selling whisky in violation of
298
the National Prohibition Act. The Court overturned the verdict because the trial court failed to allow the defendant to
289. See Woo Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412 (9th Cir. 1915); Lombardo,
supra note 28, at 221.
290. Woo Wai, 223 F. at 412.
291. Id. at 413.
292. Id. at 414.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 415.
295. Id. (“We are of the opinion that it is against public policy to sustain a
conviction obtained in the manner which is disclosed by the evidence in this
case, taking the testimony of the defendants to be true, and that a sound public policy can be upheld only by denying the criminality of those who are thus
induced to commit acts which infringe the letter of the criminal statutes.”).
296. See generally Annotation, Entrapment to Commit Crime with View to
Punishment Therefor, 86 A.L.R. 263 (1933).
297. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 452–53 (1932).
298. Id. at 438. The Act was later repealed by the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI; see also
Benjamin Grubb, Note, Exorcising the Ghosts of the Past: An Exploration of
Alcoholic Beverage Regulation in Oklahoma, 37 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 289,
296–97 (2012) (explaining the adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment).
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299

raise an entrapment defense. The Court specifically noted
that the federal agents twice asked the defendant to buy the
300
whisky, and twice he refused. It was only after the undercover agent appealed to the defendant’s nostalgia for his old World
War I division, in which both men served, that the defendant
301
finally acquiesced and bought the whisky. The majority reasoned:
It is clear that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a finding that
the act for which defendant was prosecuted was instigated by the
prohibition agent, that it was the creature of his purpose, that defendant had no previous disposition to commit it but was an industrious, law-abiding citizen, and that the agent lured defendant, otherwise innocent, to its commission by repeated and persistent
solicitation in which he succeeded by taking advantage of the sentiment aroused by reminiscences of their experiences as companions in
302
arms in the World War.

The majority, in line with Woo Wai, focused on the state of
mind of the defendant and the fact that the defendant was oth303
erwise innocent or not predisposed to commit the crime. This
became what is now known as the subjective test used by fed304
eral courts, the military, and the majority of states.
The concurrence questioned the majority’s focus on the defendant’s subjective intent, finding an internal inconsistency
305
with the majority’s reasoning. On the one hand, the defendant had fulfilled the intent required for the crime, but, on the
other hand, the defendant was not really guilty because of
299. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 459.
300. Id. at 439.
301. Id. at 440–41; see also Lombardo, supra note 28, at 222 (discussing the
scenario in which the undercover agent coerced the defendant in Sorrells).
302. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 441.
303. Id. at 443.
304. See United States v. Vanzandt, 14 M.J. 332 (C.M.A. 1982) (detailing
the history of entrapment in the military and the establishment of the subjective test); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M.
916(g) (“Entrapment. It is a defense that the criminal design or suggestion to
commit the offense originated in the Government and the accused had no predisposition to commit the offense.”); Lombardo, supra note 28, at 221–24 (noting that the majority of states and federal authorities use subjective entrapment test); Wadie E. Said, The Terrorist Informant, 85 WASH. L. REV. 687, 693
(2010). The typical entrapment situation in the military would involve police
trying to persuade a soldier to commit a crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Kemp, 42 M.J. 839 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (finding that defendant was not
entrapped by undercover Naval Criminal Investigative Service agent). The
Court’s most recent decision on the subject affirmed the subjective test. See
Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 550 (1992) (finding that prosecution
did not show predisposition in context of multiple year sting operation).
305. See Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 453–58.
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306

someone else’s conduct. To avoid this conceptual difficulty,
the concurrence instead focused on the role of the government
307
in persuading the defendant to commit the crime. It suggested that the entrapment defense embodies a public policy principle against crimes “instigated by the government’s own
308
agents.” This focus on government practices, in lieu of the defendant’s state of mind, would eventually become the objective
309
test used in a minority of state jurisdictions. The following
310
sections expand on these two respective tests.

306. Id. at 455–56, 459.
307. Id. at 459.
308. Id. at 458–59. The term “government agents” includes federal, state,
or local law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., United States v. Perl, 584 F.2d
1316, 1321 n.3 (4th Cir. 1978) (explaining that government involvement includes “federal, state, or local law enforcement officials or their agents”). But
the term also includes individuals who may not have official enforcement status. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 7, at 418 (1985) (“The defense of entrapment does not arise . . . if the inducement comes from a private person
with no official [government] connection. However, the required connection is
stated to include many others beside policemen and prosecuting officials.”).
The basic principle of agency establishes whether a person is acting as a government agent. See, e.g., State v. Ogden, 640 A.2d 6, 11 (Vt. 1993) (explaining
that a government agent relationship is established within the typical rules of
agency). This would include informants and other government agents who
may not have official duties as officers. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 7,
at 418–19. The military uses a similar definition. See MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(g), Discussion (“The ‘Government’ includes agents of the Government and persons cooperating with them
(for example, informants).”).
309. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 231–32 (noting that a minority of
state jurisdictions follow the objective test). The Model Penal Code also endorses the objective entrapment test. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13; see also
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 232 (discussing the Model Penal Code approach).
310. Some states follow a hybrid approach incorporating both tests. See,
e.g., State v. Florez, 636 A.2d 1040, 1047 (N.J. 1994) (explaining that the
“statutory defense [of entrapment] has both subjective and objective elements”); England v. State, 887 S.W.2d 902, 910 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that a mixed subjective and objective test is most appropriate in light of
the entrapment defense statute and caselaw construing it). It is worth noting
that these tests are different from a constitutional argument against conviction, which would require egregious or overreaching behavior that contravenes
a person’s due process rights. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
429–30 (1973); Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 452. However, this type of constitutional
violation has a high burden that is rarely successful. See Hampton v. United
States, 425 U.S. 484, 490–91 (1976); PAUL MARCUS, THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE § 7.01–.08 (4th ed. 2009).

2014]

ENTRAPPED

2155

1. Subjective Test
The subjective test for entrapment traditionally carries two
311
conceptually distinct factors: inducement and predisposition.
The government must have induced the defendant to commit
the crime, and the defendant must not have been predisposed
312
to commit the crime. As a threshold requirement, the inducement component is typically easy to satisfy and simply requires a showing that the government in some way encouraged
313
or actively participated in the crime.
The main focus of the subjective test turns on the predisposition of the defendant, or, whether the defendant would have
314
committed the crime without government encouragement.
Here, the inquiry is squarely centered on the defendant’s state
315
of mind. It is important to note that this inquiry does not ad316
dress the defendant’s criminal intent. This is assumed, because the entrapped defendant has presumptively satisfied the
317
specific mens rea requirements for the criminal act. Nevertheless, the defendant argues she is not culpable because of the

311. See United States v. Whittle, 34 M.J. 206, 208 (C.M.A. 1992) (“The
first element is generally referred to as the inducement element and the second as the predisposition element.”); Paton, supra note 287, at 1000–01.
312. See, e.g., United States v. Larson, 64 M.J. 559 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
2006); Hardin v. State, 358 N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ind. 1976). The defendant traditionally has the burden of production in showing some evidence of inducement,
at which point the burden of persuasion rests on the government to show that
the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 918 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brisbane, 729 F.
Supp. 2d 99, 113 (D.D.C. 2010); Whittle, 34 M.J. at 208 (noting that the initial
burden of production is on the defendant but ultimate burden of persuasion of
showing predisposition rests with the government). The ultimate question of
whether the defendant was entrapped also typically falls on the jury. PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT § 6.04 (2012 ed.); see
MARCUS, supra note 310, § 6.04.
313. See United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979) (requiring
evidence which amounts to “more than a scintilla”); Paton, supra note 287, at
1001.
314. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1165 (10th Cir. 1986)
(“[E]ntrapment raises the issue of whether the criminal intent originated with
the defendant or with government agents.”); United States v. Clark, 28 M.J.
401 (C.M.A. 1989).
315. See, e.g., People v. Sprouse, 983 P.2d 771, 776 (Colo. 1999).
316. See Katrice L. Bridges, Note, The Forgotten Constitutional Right to
Present a Defense and Its Impact on the Acceptance of ResponsibilityEntrapment Debate, 103 MICH. L. REV. 367, 374–76 (2004).
317. See id.
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lack of predisposition. In making this determination, courts
look at a variety of factors, including the character and reputation of the defendant, the defendant’s prior criminal record,
whether the government first suggested the criminal activity,
whether the defendant engaged in the crime for profit, whether
the defendant demonstrated a reluctance to commit the offense,
and the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by the
319
government. Probably the most important consideration in
showing lack of predisposition is the extent to which the defendant was reluctant to commit the crime in the face of gov320
ernment inducement. Inducement here includes “excessive
pressure, threats, or the exploitation of an unfair advantage,”
but would not include “simple solicitation [or] [e]mpty promises
that a crime, once committed, will produce no adverse reper321
cussions.” This means police “are not precluded from utilizing
artifice and stealth” as long as “they merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense by one predis322
posed or ready to commit it.” Predisposition here may be evidenced by the defendant’s enthusiastic participation in the
323
crime.

318. Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988) (“When a defendant
pleads entrapment, he is asserting that, although he had criminal intent, it
was ‘the Government’s deception [that implanted] the criminal design in the
mind of the defendant.’” (quoting United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 436
(1973))); Bridges, supra note 316, at 373–76 (noting that entrapment does not
dispute factual guilt). A defendant who claimed she did not know she was
committing a crime would more appropriately assert a mistake of law defense.
See supra Part III.B.1.
319. United States v. Higham, 98 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1996); People v.
Kulwin, 593 N.E.2d 717, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
320. See, e.g., Higham, 98 F.3d at 291; United States v. Garza-Juarez, 992
F.2d 896, 908 (9th Cir. 1993). But see United States v. Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007,
1014 (A.C.M.R. 1986) (declining to “treat any one factor as on its face being
more important than any other”).
321. United States v. Ramos-Paulino, 488 F.3d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 2007); see
also Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376–78 (1958) (finding that defendant was entrapped by informant pretending to be recovering addict in
great suffering to persuade defendant to obtain illegal narcotics for him);
United States v. Myers, 575 F.3d 801, 806 (8th Cir. 2009).
322. See United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 902, 909 (9th Cir. 1994).
323. United States v. Rodriguez, 43 F.3d 117, 126–27 (5th Cir. 1995). It is
important to note that defendant’s knowledge of the criminality of the act is
not relevant. It stands to reason that the defendant probably knew what she
was doing was unlawful, but this knowledge (or lack thereof) is more relevant
in the mistake of law context. See supra Part III.B.1.

2014]

ENTRAPPED

2157

2. Objective Test
The objective test centers on the conduct of the government
324
agents instead of the specific state of mind of the defendant.
The crucial question under this test is whether the government
practices were so extreme that they created a substantial risk
325
It is
that a law-abiding person would commit the crime.
worth noting that “some tactics employing misrepresentation
and persuasion are necessary to successful police work and
326
ought not to be forbidden.” For instance, the government can
set up sting operations where police pose as potential victims or
327
co-conspirators. The prototypical case would involve government agents posing as drug buyers in order to ferret out drug
328
suppliers. However, these activities cross the line into entrapment when the government agents go beyond simply
providing an opportunity to commit the crime and instead engage in “overbearing conduct such as badgering, cajoling, [or]
329
importuning.” For instance, repeated invitations and pressuring by government agents to commit a certain crime would
330
most likely constitute entrapment. Making false representations that induce someone to believe that the conduct is not
331
criminal would also qualify. In making this determination,
332
“the propensities of the particular defendant are irrelevant.”
324. See Russell, 411 U.S. at 445–50 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen the
agents’ involvement in criminal activities goes beyond the mere offering of
such an opportunity and when their conduct is of a kind that could induce or
instigate the commission of a crime by one not ready and willing to commit it,
then regardless of the character or propensities of the particular person induced [entrapment] has occurred.”).
325. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alaska 1969); Commonwealth
v. Jones, 363 A.2d 1281, 1285 (Pa. 1976); State v. Martinez, 848 P.2d 702, 706
(Utah Ct. App. 1993). The defendant typically has the burden of persuasion to
show that a hypothetical law-abiding citizen would have also committed the
crime. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 5, at 415 (1985); MARCUS, supra
note 310, § 6.01, .05. The judge, not jury, also typically but not always decides
whether the defendant was entrapped under this formulation. See Russell, 411
U.S. at 441 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“Under [the objective approach], the determination of the lawfulness of the Government’s conduct must be made . . .
by the trial judge, not the jury.”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 6.09.
326. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 2, at 408.
327. See, e.g., State v. James, 484 N.W.2d 799, 800–01 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992).
328. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1992).
329. People v. Barraza, 591 P.2d 947, 955 (Cal. 1979).
330. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 439–41 (1932); Woo
Wai v. United States, 223 F. 412, 412–14 (9th Cir. 1996).
331. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(1)(a).
332. Id. § 2.13 cmt. 3, at 411.
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The inquiry focuses on the effect of the government’s conduct
333
on a normal, law-abiding person in the defendant’s situation.
If the practices would cause this hypothetical person to commit
the crime, the defendant would be successful in raising an entrapment defense.
As previously mentioned, this objective standard may be
likened to the objective scrutiny inquiry in the duress defense
in the sense that both ask about what a reasonable person
334
would do in the situation. However, with duress, this element
functions as a secondary requirement such that the defendant
must also in good faith be coerced. With entrapment, in a jurisdiction that has adopted the objective test, there is no subjective requirement. The focus is entirely on the hypothetical person and whether government tactics would have convinced him
to commit the crime.
3. Scholars’ Reactions
Scholars have pointed out advantages and disadvantages
to both the subjective and objective tests. A key advantage of
335
the subjective test is that it keeps the focus on the defendant.
As a result, it punishes only those who would have committed
336
the crime regardless of the government’s action. Yet some
have noted that in its attempt to assess the defendant’s guilt,
the subjective test also inappropriately focuses on a defendant’s
337
prior history as relevant to the instant determination. This
may unfairly prejudice the defendant based on her prior con338
duct. Professor Louis Michael Seidman has also questioned
whether the subjective test really provides a practically distinct

333. People v. Lee, 219 Cal. App. 3d 829 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); People v. Alford, 251 N.W.2d 314 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977), aff’d, 275 N.W.2d 484 (Mich.
1979). This contextual analysis would naturally include the interaction of the
defendant with the government agent and the defendant’s response to the
agent’s inducements. See, e.g., Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alaska 1969);
Barraza, 591 P.2d at 955.
334. See supra Part III.A.1.
335. Paton, supra note 287, at 1029.
336. Id.
337. See Damon D. Camp, Out of the Quagmire After Jacobson v. United
States: Towards a More Balanced Entrapment Standard, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1055, 1066–68 (1993); Andrew H. Costinett, Note, “In a Puff of
Smoke”: Drug Crime and the Perils of Subjective Entrapment, 48 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1757, 1766–70 (2011).
338. Costinett, supra note 337, at 1766–70 (noting the unfair prejudice that
may arise by examining a defendant’s prior criminal record or bad acts).
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analysis from the objective standard. He argues that because
predisposition means readiness to commit a crime, the only
way for courts to ascertain this level of intent is to posit a minimum level of inducement by which even an innocent person
340
would respond. Distinguishing a defendant who is worthy of
punishment from one who is not will ultimately turn on the
government’s conduct—the central feature of the objective
341
standard.
Similarly, the objective test garners both positive and negative reactions. Scholars seem to praise the idea that this test
eschews any discussion of a defendant’s prior acts and instead
focuses solely on the government’s action in this particular
342
case. With its emphasis on government inducement, this test
also serves to guard against government misconduct in the fu343
ture. One major drawback according to some is that the test
places too much emphasis on what a hypothetical reasonable
344
person would do in the defendant’s situation. As Scott Paton
writes, “The concern is that the objective analysis takes place
in a vacuum of abstractuess [sic] where intangibles battle each
345
other.”
The purpose of this Article is not to debate the merits of
these two tests. The important takeaway for my argument is
that neither test carries the dual objective and subjective stateof-mind requirements found in duress or mistake of law. The
subjective entrapment defense has a single test that focuses
346
solely on what the defendant thought. There is no additional
339. See Louis Michael Seidman, The Supreme Court, Entrapment, and
Our Criminal Justice Dilemma, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 118–19 (1981).
340. See id.; see also Rebecca Roiphe, The Serpent Beguiled Me: A History
of the Entrapment Defense, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 257, 294–95 (2003) (discussing Seidman’s argument).
341. Seidman, supra note 339, at 118–19; Andrew Carlon, Note, Entrapment, Punishment, and the Sadistic State, 93 VA. L. REV. 1081, 1093–95
(2007). Perhaps, for this reason, some scholars favor a hybrid approach that
incorporates features of both tests. See, e.g., Paton, supra note 287, at 1032–
34; Jeffrey N. Klar, Note, The Need for a Dual Approach to Entrapment, 59
WASH. U. L.Q. 199, 200 n.10 (1981).
342. See Paton, supra note 287, at 1030–31.
343. See Klar, supra note 341, at 211–12; Paton, supra note 287, at 1030–
31.
344. See Roger Park, The Entrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REV. 163,
216–24 (1976); Klar, supra note 341, at 218.
345. See Paton, supra note 287, at 1031.
346. See, e.g., Lombardo, supra note 28, at 221–24 (outlining the fundamentals of the subjective entrapment defense and tracking its evolution).
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element of objective scrutiny. The objective entrapment test
also asks only one question—whether the government’s conduct
was so extreme as to induce a law-abiding person to commit the
crime. There is no additional analysis or scrutiny of the defend348
ant’s state of mind. Whether she is guilty or otherwise pre349
disposed is not relevant. While the objective test does incorporate a reasonable person standard, the purpose is to evaluate
the government’s conduct and its effect on this hypothetical
person, not scrutinize the defendant’s state of mind, as in cases
350
of duress or mistake of law.
4. The Role of Government Pressure in the Crime
The entrapment defense does not share the same dual
state-of-mind requirements found in the mistake of law or du351
ress defenses. This appears to be more than just historical coincidence. When the defense was being codified at the turn of
the last century, the reasonable person standard was already
352
being used. So courts could have easily incorporated this objective scrutiny requirement targeting the defendant’s state of
mind, but chose not to do so. The explanation seems to center
353
on the unique role of the government in the entrapment case.
Unlike with other criminal law defenses, which typically in354
volve conduct amongst private citizens, in the entrapment
347. See Paton, supra note 287, at 1000–02 (emphasizing the fact that individual predisposition underlies the subjective entrapment analysis).
348. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1090.
349. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 229–30.
350. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1091 (speaking to the evaluation
of the hypothetical individual).
351. See, e.g., Paton, supra note 287, at 1029–32 (comparing the objective
and subjective approaches to entrapment and illustrating a lack of dual stateof-mind requirements in the traditional tests).
352. See Roiphe, supra note 340, at 258–59.
353. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1099–1102 (suggesting that one of
entrapment’s traditional underpinnings has been a desire to check state conduct).
354. Necessity comes to mind as a criminal defense that does not necessarily involve conduct amongst private citizens. Typically a defendant commits a
crime in order to avert a greater harm caused by natural forces. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410 (1980) (noting that necessity involves a “situation where physical forces beyond the actor’s control rendered
illegal conduct the lesser of two evils”); MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1985).
Even here, though, courts use a reasonable person standard, which makes
sense since the government also plays no active role in this crime. See Monu
Bedi, Excusing Behavior: Reclassifying the Federal Common Law Defenses of
Duress and Necessity Relying on the Victim’s Role, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 575, 584 (2011) [hereinafter Bedi, Excusing Behavior].
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scenario the government is uniquely responsible for causing the
355
crime.
Take the subjective test. The focus is on the defendant’s
culpability and whether she would have committed the crime
356
but for the government’s actions. A defendant pressured by
the government to commit a crime is not as blameworthy as
357
someone who was not coerced in any way. The reasoning is
358
retributive in nature. The defendant who is not predisposed
is not deserving of punishment, whereas one who is predis359
posed should be found guilty. Even though the entrapped defendant knew what he was doing was unlawful, it was only the
government’s conduct that made the former commit the
360
crime. In this way, the government can be seen as partly cul361
pable for the crime based on its tactics. As has been noted:
The government or its officials do not suddenly become guilty of the
crime. This analysis is not rooted in criminal liability but rather intuitive notions of culpability. Because the government caused the defendant to commit the crime, the blame for the offense appropriately
362
shifts to the government, and the defendant is found not guilty.
355. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341 at 1083–85 (delineating between “private entrapment”—which does not provide a defense—and entrapment by
state actors).
356. Jonathan Carlson, The Act Requirement and the Foundation of the Entrapment Defense, 73 VA. L. REV. 1011, 1037 (1987) (“[T]he supporters of the
culpability rationale assert that, if the offender was predisposed before the inducement, he is culpable despite the encouragement and should therefore be
punished. Thus the defense relates to the defendant’s ‘normative culpability,’
and resembles other defenses of excuse in the criminal law.”).
357. See United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 429 (1973) (“[T]o determine
whether entrapment has been established, a line must be drawn between the
trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” (quoting
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958))); Sherman, 356 U.S. at
376 (arguing that the purpose of entrapment is to prevent government from
taking advantage of the “weaknesses of an innocent party” and trick him or
her into “committing crimes which he [or she] otherwise would not have attempted”); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 448 (1932) (noting the
availability of the entrapment defense to “persons otherwise innocent” who are
lured by the government to commit the crime).
358. Anthony Dillof, Unraveling Unlawful Entrapment, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 827, 845 (2004).
359. See Park, supra note 344, at 240 (“Since [the entrapped defendants]
are less blameworthy, they are less deserving of retributive punishment
. . . .”).
360. See Lombardo, supra note 28, at 234–54 for an extended discussion of
causation as it relates to government conduct in the entrapment context.
361. See, e.g., Sherman, 356 U.S. at 376 (noting that in entrapment cases
the government “beguiles” the defendant into committing the crime).
362. Monu Bedi, Blame It on the Government: A Justification for the Disparate Treatment of Departures Based on Cultural Ties, 38 CAP. U. L. REV.
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To hold otherwise would be unfair to the defendant.
Some scholars have argued against this principal of reduced culpability. The primary thrust here is that “if government encouragement truly diminishes individual culpability for
criminal conduct, then private encouragement should diminish
culpability as well. But no one argues that the entrapment de363
fense is proper in the case of private encouragement . . . .”
There is nothing problematic about this divergent result.
Again, the difference here is private versus public coercion.
When the very entity prosecuting the individual causes the
commission of the crime, a different standard should apply.
This does not mean that the privately coerced defendant is not
sympathetic or is otherwise equally as culpable as someone
who commits the crime without any external threats. To be
sure, this is what allows this coerced defendant to escape liabil364
ity under a duress defense. The point here is that we should
not subject the entrapped defendant to the same reasonable
person standard that applies to the duress defendant. This
gives the government too much advantage given that it is partly culpable in pressuring the defendant to commit the crime.
One could analogize the reasoning here to the doctrine of unjust enrichment in the civilian context. This tort requires a person to make another whole if the former unfairly receives a
365
benefit at the expense of the latter. In the entrapment case,
by imposing a reasonable person standard on the defendant,
the government would be unfairly enriched because it would
receive the benefit of increasing the chance of a obtaining a
conviction (by requiring the defendant’s state of mind be reasonable) even though it caused the defendant to commit the
crime. The same considerations are not present with private
coercion because the actor doing the coercion has no stake in
the subsequent duress trial.
The objective standard is also grounded in the government’s improper role in facilitating the crime, except that this
time, the focus is on the actions of the government rather than
366
the relative culpability of the defendant. The point here is to
789, 818 (2010) [hereinafter Bedi, Blame It on the Government].
363. Carlson, supra note 356, at 1038; see also United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423, 442 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Dillof, supra note 358, at
845–52.
364. See, e.g., Bedi, Blame It on the Government, supra note 362, at 816.
365. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
§ 1 (Discussion Draft 2000).
366. See Carlson, supra note 356, at 1044–45.
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deter extreme tactics and strategies by the government, not
367
The ramake sure an innocent defendant is exonerated.
368
tionale is thus utilitarian in nature, not retributive. Allowing
a defendant to escape liability in this circumstance helps deter
369
To
improper government overreach and police instigation.
foreclose the possibility of an objectivity-based defense would
thus encourage the continued use of this type of unwanted government coercion. Such behavior also detracts from the government’s proper task of apprehending offenders without any
370
encouragement. Moreover, “[s]uch tactics spread suspicion in
the community and can . . . injur[e] . . . the reputation of law
371
enforcement institutions . . . .”
While the objective entrapment test also invokes a reason372
the perspective and underlying raable person construct,
tionale of this element are quite different than in duress or
mistake of law. There, the purpose is to promulgate a uniform
373
community standard among citizens. This is why the objective test for those defenses asks whether a reasonable person
would have similarly succumbed to the threats or whether a
reasonable person would have relied on the interpretation of
374
the law. On the other hand, the focus in entrapment is on the
government’s behavior and whether its tactics would have
375
caused the hypothetical person to succumb to the pressure. In
turn, the justification centers on deterring inappropriate government tactics so future citizens are not placed in this type of
376
compromising situation. Establishing uniform societal norms
is not relevant, unless the norm relates to promoting certain
377
behavior by government actors. This difference makes sense
because the source of the pressure in the entrapment situation
367. See id.
368. See Dillof, supra note 358, at 860–61 (noting that objective tests act
“as prophylactic devices to inhibit future police conduct”).
369. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406–07 (1985).
370. See id.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Park, supra note 344, at 165–66.
373. See, e.g., Parry, supra note 262, at 13–14, 23–24.
374. See, e.g., Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985) (dealing
with mistake of law); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (duress).
375. See, e.g., Roiphe, supra note 340, at 258–59 (tracking the development
of the reasonable person standard as it relates to entrapment).
376. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406–07.
377. Lombardo, supra note 28, at 241–43 (examining the tension that is
sometimes created as a result of the objective test’s singular focus on government misconduct).
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is the government instead of a private citizen, as in mistake of
378
law or duress. If the point is to prevent these crimes from being committed, the government no doubt has more control over
its own agents’ conduct than it has over private citizens with no
affiliation with the government.
B. THE ENTRAPPED SOLDIER: OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS
RECONCEPTUALIZED
The obedience to orders defense looks a lot like a case of
entrapment. Both involve a defendant being coerced or other379
wise pressured by government agents to commit a crime. In
the entrapment situation, the government takes the form of
undercover police, and the pressure takes the form of induce380
ment through manipulation or cajoling. In the military context, the government agent takes the form of a commanding
381
soldier, and the coercion takes the form of a military order.
This shared direct government involvement sets these defenses
apart from both mistake of law and duress. In fact, the government pressure is qualitatively greater in the military than
the civilian context. Not acquiescing to a police officer’s cajoling
does not carry any adverse consequences, while disobeying a
382
military order carries the threat of criminal punishment.
This suggests that the rationales and underlying justification
behind the entrapment model apply with even greater force in
the obedience to orders context.
For instance, both situations are tied up with important
government objectives. In the entrapment context, police are
383
supposed to ferret out criminal activity. They are expected to
employ sting operations that entice defendants to commit
378. See, e.g., Carlon, supra note 341, at 1083–84 (noting the essential nature of government action in entrapment and the unavailability of a “private
entrapment” defense).
379. Compare supra Part I, with MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13.
380. See Richard McAdams, The Political Economy of Entrapment, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 107, 110–11 (2005) (discussing the types of undercover police operations which might give rise to entrapment scenarios).
381. Commanding soldiers would squarely fall under the definition of government agents. See supra note 308.
382. Absent fulfillment of a criminal act, no crime has been committed. See
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 219–24 for a discussion of the development of
causation analysis—including the fundamental act requirement—in the entrapment context. See supra Part II.B.
383. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (recognizing the
state’s legitimate role in interdicting criminal activity through undercover
means).
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384

crimes. But the police cross the line when they engage in ex385
treme tactics and pressure. Similarly, lawful orders are part
386
and parcel of an effective military regime. Subordinates are
fully expected to follow lawful orders issued by their superi387
ors. But this activity crosses the line when soldiers give un388
lawful orders, pressuring subordinates to commit crimes.
Both defenses serve to regulate these competing concerns.
Accordingly, for both doctrinal and policy-related reasons,
it seems inconsistent for military courts to apply the dual stateof-mind requirements in obedience to orders cases, in line with
mistake of law and duress, while the same courts apply a separate test for entrapment. Given the similarities in form and
function as well as the underlying rationales, the contours of
the obedience to orders defense should more closely resemble
389
those of entrapment.
This Article does not necessarily take a position on which
test—objective or subjective—should be used in the obedience
to orders case. It stands to reason that the subjective probably
would be the favored test, as the military version of entrapment
390
uses a subjective test. Either test provides a narrowly tai384. See Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549–50 (1992) (reaffirming the government’s ability to conduct sting operations).
385. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406 (1985).
386. See generally supra Part III.A.2.
387. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892
(2012).
388. The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that subordinates are
obligated to follow the lawful orders of their superiors. Id.
389. One might also draw a parallel between obedience to orders and the
relatively obscure civilian defense of assisting an unlawful arrest. Under this
defense, a private citizen can defend against assault or related charges when
this person “is summoned by a peace officer to assist in effecting an unlawful
arrest . . . .” MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(4). Courts typically require that the
individual believe the arrest is lawful, or at minimum not believe that the arrest is unlawful, before this defense applies. See id. cmt. 5 & n.40, at 127 (collecting statutes focusing on the subjective belief of the private citizen from
various jurisdictions). Because this defense only applies when a crime is committed in the unique context of assisting a police officer in an arrest (i.e., the
crime committed is collateral to the assistance given to the officer) the focus
here has been to use entrapment, which, like obedience to orders, broadly applies to any situation involving government coercion where a defendant is directly pressured to commit the target crime. For further discussion of this little-used defense and its relation to entrapment, see generally Craig Hemmens
& Daniel Levin, ‘Not a Law at All’: A Call for a Return to the Common Law
Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999). Nevertheless, it is
worth noting that this defense, like entrapment, also does not carry an objective scrutiny requirement—further bolstering the instant argument.
390. It stands to reason that that the subjective test would be the favored
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lored defense that appropriately recognizes the government’s
391
role in the crime and accounts for its behavior. This reconceptualization also serves to balance the competing concerns of fostering military discipline, on the one hand, and upholding the
supremacy of the law, on the other.
The subjective test would focus on a soldier’s state of mind
and ask whether the soldier was otherwise predisposed to
commit the act. This inquiry assumes that the soldier satisfies
the mens rea of the crime, but because of the government’s role,
392
the soldier is nevertheless not culpable. The operative question of predisposition is a little tricky in the military context.
The point here is to ask whether the defendant would likely
have committed the crime but for the government coercion. But
in the military context, the subordinate would most likely have
393
done nothing if the order had not been given. Soldiers are not
394
supposed to take action on their own accord. Military structure—contrary to civilian life—fosters obedience, not independ395
However, predisposition can still work as a viable
ence.
396
standard. Courts could look at a variety of factors: the eagermethod, as the military version of entrapment uses a subjective test. See
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(h).
391. The current procedural requirements regarding burden of persuasion
and jury question should remain the same. The subjective test poses no problem. It, too, puts the burden of persuasion on the government and requires
that the jury find that the defendant was otherwise predisposed to commit the
crime. See supra note 312. However, with the objective test, the burden is typically on the defendant, and the judge makes a determination as to the success
of the defense. See supra note 325. Keeping the current procedural posture
where the government bears the burden does not take away from my argument. My focus is on adopting the substantive elements of the entrapment defense, not its procedural idiosyncrasies.
392. Typically, crimes under the Uniform Code of Military Justice include
an element that the offense was committed unlawfully or wrongfully, which
would contemplate a soldier raising the obedience to orders defense. See, e.g.,
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at arts. 118(b), (c)(1)
(murder), 121(b)(1), (d) (larceny). I use the term mens rea to identify the specific mental state relevant to the crime (e.g., “intends to kill,” “takes, obtains,
withholds . . . from the possession of the owner”) not the overall lawfulness or
unlawfulness of the act. See id. at arts. 118(a), 121(a).
393. Causation being, of course, of central importance to entrapment. See
generally Lombardo, supra note 28.
394. The fundamental nature of this precept was demonstrated by criticism
of the United States Army’s relatively short-lived “An Army of One” advertising slogan. See, e.g., E. KELLY TAYLOR, AMERICA’S ARMY AND THE LANGUAGE
OF GRUNTS 23 (2010).
395. See generally supra Part III.A.2.
396. It may turn out that knowledge of the unlawful order remains easier
to assess. Keeping the current subjective element—i.e., whether the solider
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ness or reluctance of the soldier to obey the order, the soldier’s
prior history of taking this type of action, and whether the soldier at any point suggested taking the action. Combined, these
factors can point to a soldier who was otherwise inclined to
397
take the unlawful action.
This formulation also tracks the subjective entrapment
test’s emphasis on relative or reduced culpability. The defendant is not guilty, because the government—this time, through
the acts of its military soldiers—is partly culpable for the commission of the crime. It created the situation and circumstances
under which the subordinate soldier followed the unlawful order. As in the entrapment case, the focus is on retributive notions of punishment. Because the soldier was not wholly responsible for the act on account of her following orders, she
should not be responsible. The aforementioned unjust enrichment argument, in fact, applies with even greater force in the
398
obedience to orders context. Unlike in the civilian context—
where prosecutorial discretion does not reside with the government agents who have entrapped the defendant—
prosecutorial discretion in the military resides with the very
command structure from which the unlawful order promul399
Furthermore, it seems particularly unfair to allow
gates.
knew the order was unlawful—is not necessarily problematic for my argument. As long as the inquiry is focused on the defendant’s state of mind—and
there is no secondary objective scrutiny assessment—the spirit of the subjective entrapment test remains intact, and it can still serve as the appropriate
civilian analog. Given the unique nature of military orders versus government
inducement, this slight difference may be necessary.
397. It stands to reason that the further disconnected the criminal act is
from a purported military objective, the easier it will be to show predisposition. For instance, if a soldier commits rape based on a superior order, it is
hard to imagine how this would not satisfy the subjective test since there
would be absolutely no possible military reason for committing this act. On the
other hand, killing unarmed individuals may seemingly serve a military objective (even if it turns out not be) and so close analysis of the soldier’s response
to the order and her prior experience would be required before determining
whether she was otherwise predisposed. See infra Section IV.C. Any lingering
issues with using the subjective entrapment test in the military context is not
fatal to my argument but simply means that the objective entrapment test
probably should be the favored test when employing my reconceptualized obedience to orders defense.
398. See supra Part IV.A.4.
399. See Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 15, 18–20 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 815, 818–20 (2012)); MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra
note 28, at R.C.M. 306; Richard Cole, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Military
Justice System: Is It Time for a Change?, 19 Am. Crim. L. 395 (1992) (discussing how military commanders hold prosecutorial discretion unlike in the civilian context where prosecutors decide what charges to bring).
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prosecution in this situation given that the soldier—unlike her
entrapped counterpart—is performing a vital service for the
government.
The alternative would be to use the objective test. This
would involve examining the circumstances under which the
order was given. The operative question would be whether the
government’s tactics would have caused a law-abiding hypo400
thetical soldier to follow the order. This hypothetical soldier
401
could be similar to a person of common understanding. The
basic point here is to postulate a general objective standard
that is not tied to the defendant’s particular experiences and
training. Unlike the current objective scrutiny, however, the
inquiry here focuses on the government’s actions and their effect on a soldier of common understanding rather than the defendant’s state of mind and whether her understanding of the
law comports with that of a person of “common understanding.”
In the military context, the government’s actions would revolve around the situation in which the soldier finds herself, including the nature of the order, the way in which it was given,
the amount of time given to execute it, etc. All of these factors
come into play when deciding if a hypothetical soldier would
have followed the order or could have resisted the command.
For instance, the soldier could have received the order on the
battlefield, where there was no time to question or clarify the
order. This would suggest a successful application of the objective test. On the other hand, it may turn out that the order was
given in a strategic meeting where there was plenty of time to
question or otherwise challenge the order without any immediate consequences. These factors may militate in favor of conviction. None of this takes away from the fact that, unlike in the
civilian context, the subordinate is obligated to follow the order.
Still, there are circumstances that would make it easier (or less
difficult) for the soldier not to obey the order. The greater this
likelihood, the less successful the obedience to orders defense
would be under this test.
400. Like with the current obedience to orders defense, presumption would
favor the defendant. See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 28 (C.M.A.
1973) (starting presumption with an obedience to orders defense is that orders
under question were lawful). The government would have to show that a hypothetical soldier of common understanding would have been able to refuse the
order.
401. The aforementioned issues of how to define a person of common understanding remain. See supra Part II.A. But this does not undercut the instant analysis on the basic contours of the defense.
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It is important to understand the different role the “soldier
of common understanding” plays in an entrapment-based objective test as opposed to the current dual state-of-mind model.
With an entrapment model, the focus is on the effect of the or402
der on a person of common understanding, whereas under
the current objective element of the obedience to orders defense, the focus is on what a person of common understanding
403
would have known. In other words, the proposed objective
test would use this hypothetical person to scrutinize the circumstances surrounding the order and ask whether a soldier
would have done the same thing instead of using it as a check
on the defendant’s state of mind and asking whether the soldier
404
would have known the same thing.
Using the entrapment-based framework also tracks the rationale of the objective test and its focus on utilitarian princi405
ples. Exonerating the soldier will help encourage the government to better train commanding officers so that future
soldiers are not placed in such compromising situations. Again,
we are not dealing with interactions among private citizens.
Because the government has better control over commanding
officers than civilians with no connection to the government, it
makes sense that the objective scrutiny and its underlying rationale are aimed at regulating government behavior rather
406
than the subordinate’s behavior.
One may argue, however, that regulating the behavior of
soldiers caught in this situation is just as important as regulating the behavior of commanding officers who promulgate the
402. See supra Part IV.A.
403. See supra Part I.D.
404. Exactly how this objective test would be administered in a courtmartial setting probably needs further development. This Article, however, is
less concerned with the intricacies of how this test would be applied (though
this is definitely an important enterprise) and more interested in constructing
a framework that would justify its use in the first place.
405. See, e.g., Dillof, supra note 358, 860–61 (discussing the theoretical underpinnings of the objective test).
406. It does not matter that the soldier, in promulgating an unlawful order,
is not necessarily seeking to convict the subordinate solider, unlike the police
officer who is trying to get the civilian to commit the crime. The overall aim of
deterring improper or unwanted government behavior still applies in both
scenarios. In the civilian context, this takes the form of deterring overzealous
or otherwise extreme tactics by the police so they do not get a conviction at
any cost. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 cmt. 1, at 406 (1985). In the military
context, it takes the form of deterring commanding officers from issuing unlawful orders to fulfill the mission at any costs or to satisfy other improper motives.
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407

order. The same can be said of entrapment. Regulating behavior of entrapped citizens is just as important as regulating
the behavior of undercover police officers. This is a valid point,
yet in the entrapment context, courts have not tailored the de408
fense’s elements accordingly. The focus squarely falls on the
409
government’s actions. It is for a different day to argue whether entrapment should be changed. This Article takes the defense and its underlying rationale at face value. If this doctrine
serves its purpose and its underlying rationales appropriately
account for the government role in the crime, then for the reasons described herein, obedience to orders should be realigned
in the same way.
The possibility that a commanding officer may not know
the order is unlawful does not change the foregoing analysis. It
is true that with civilian entrapment, police officers know that
the targeted act is a crime and intentionally try to pressure cit410
izens to commit it. Commanding soldiers may not necessarily
share the same specific intent. This person, too, may simply be
following orders from a higher-ranked individual. However,
from the perspective of the subordinate, nothing has changed.
She, like her civilian counterpart, is being pressured to commit
a crime. Indeed, even under the current obedience to orders
standard, the commanding officer’s knowledge (or lack of
knowledge) of the unlawful nature of the order is not relevant
411
to the analysis.
Another concern may be the types of crimes to which the
entrapment defense traditionally applies. The defense is typically restricted to victimless crimes such as drug offenses or
gun sales, and does not apply to crimes involving bodily inju412
ry. However, with obedience to orders cases, the crimes can
413
range from inhuman treatment, to theft, to homicide.
407. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing regulation of subordinate soldier
behavior through the extant obedience to orders defense, and touching on the
limits of the defense in shielding subordinate behavior).
408. See supra Part IV.A.
409. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13.
410. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932) (noting that
entrapment occurs “when the criminal design originates with the officials of
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission”).
411. To the extent the commanding officer was aware of the unlawful nature of the order, this individual could be prosecuted directly for giving the order. See supra note 130.
412. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13(3) (“The defense [of entrapment] is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the of-
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A few things can be said here. First, military courts do not
414
appear to restrict entrapment to a specific set of crimes. Second, there is no logical reason why this defense should not extend to any crime as long as the elements are met, even assault-related crimes. The rationales for either test would seem
to apply regardless of the nature of the crime. But even if entrapment should be restricted to certain crimes, it does not follow that such restrictions should apply in the obedience to orders context. The government coercion is qualitatively greater
in the military setting. Instead of trickery, instigation, or other
enticements, a military order comes with the threat of criminal
415
punishment. It stands to reason that the greater the government coercion, the more expansively the entrapment doctrine
416
should apply to serious crimes. Furthermore, acts of violence
are looked upon differently in a military context because often
the job of a soldier is to kill, assault, etc.

fense charged . . . .”); Keith N. Hylton & Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public
Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61, 107 (2007);
Lombardo, supra note 28, at 210; Troy A. Wolf, Persistence Pays: Enforcement
Efforts to Solicit Illegal Activity—United States v. Hinton, 908 F.2d 355 (8th
Cir. 1990), 17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 913, 913 n.2 (1991).
413. See supra Part I.
414. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 28 M.J. 401, 407 (C.M.A. 1989);
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, 2012, supra note 28, at R.C.M. 916(g); MILITARY JUDGES’ BENCHBOOK, supra note 179, § 5-6.
415. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 92, 10 U.S.C. § 892 (2012).
416. This realigning also tracks the classification of these defenses as excuses rather than justifications. These quasi-legal concepts seek to capture the
overall nature of the act. A justification defense exculpates otherwise criminal
conduct because the conduct was considered the right thing to do. See, e.g.,
Donald L. Horowitz, Justification and Excuse in the Program of the Criminal
Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 109 (seeking to further explicate the difference between excuse and justification). An excuse defense also
exculpates otherwise criminal conduct, only this time the conduct is deemed
wrongful, but the defendant is not blameworthy because of the specific circumstances surrounding the offense. Id. Focusing on the victim’s role or lack
of it, both obedience to orders and entrapment would be classified as excuse
defenses. See Bedi, Excusing Behavior, supra note 354, at 620 (arguing that
where victim played no active role in crime, criminal defense should be labeled
as excuse); Eugene R. Milhizer, The Divestiture Defense and United States v.
Collier, ARMY LAW., Mar. 1990, at 3, 10 (noting that obedience to unlawful orders functions as an excuse, not a justification); Dru Stevenson, Entrapment
and Terrorism, 49 B.C. L. REV. 125, 135 n.39 (2008) (noting that entrapment is
considered an excuse rather than a justification).
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C. DISTINCTION WITH A DIFFERENCE: TWO REAL WORLD
HYPOTHETICALS
The primary purpose of this Article is to provide a framework for the obedience to orders defense that is conceptually
more sound that the current model. Using the structure of entrapment appropriately recognizes the government’s role in the
crime. But this is not simply an academic exercise. This reconceptualization creates a defense that is more narrowly tailored
and, in turn, more accurately tracks our intuitive notions of
when liability should be imposed.
It is true that entrapment, relative to other civilian crimi417
nal law defenses, is rarely successful. This should not cause
any concerns with the instant analysis. There is no reason to
think that the basic structure of the defense is inherently overly disadvantageous to defendants. Its limited success may
simply be due to its application in the police-inducement cases.
Since the pressure typically stems from inducement or trickery,
a jury may assume that the defendant is otherwise predisposed
to commit the crime, or that the hypothetical person should
presumptively be able to resist the government tactics. This
may explain why defendants typically don’t succeed in raising
this defense. But in the military, the pressure is qualitatively
418
greater, and soldiers are generally expected to obey orders. In
short, there is a presumption of obedience that is simply not
present in the civilian context. This can explain why the entrapment model could serve soldiers better than their civilian
counterparts.
The following two situations illustrate how the entrapment
model more accurately comports with our intuitive notions of
419
punishment. First, take the Calley case, detailed earlier.
Calley claimed that he was ordered to fire upon what appeared
420
to be villagers who posed no threat to him or other soldiers.
Even though he had prior experience with villagers fighting for
the enemy, in this particular situation there was no indication
that the villagers posed a threat or were otherwise fighting for
421
the enemy. According to Calley, the initial order to kill the
villagers came a day before, when the entire platoon was being
briefed on the mission by Calley’s commanding officer, and
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.

See supra note 48.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part I.E.1.
See United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19, 24 (C.M.A. 1973).
Id. at 24, 33.
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twice again during the day of the shootings. For our purposes, let us assume that such an order was in fact given, though
423
the testimony on this issue was disputed in the case. It is
worth noting that Calley also ordered his subordinates to shoot
on the villagers (again in compliance with his commanding officer’s order), though some subordinates refused to carry out
424
As previously discussed, the jury found Calley
the order.
guilty of murder, and the court reasoned that a soldier of common understanding in the same situation would have known
425
the order was unlawful. This result follows our intuitions
that Calley should be held responsible for his actions.
Contrast this scenario with the following hypothetical. A
soldier in a combat situation overseas is ordered to shoot at a
local hospital and kill what appear to be doctors and nurses.
These individuals are taking care of wounded enemy soldiers
and, by all accounts, appear to be non-combatant medical professionals. Assume that this soldier has had significant training and experience in similar combat situations and has been
deployed on a number of life-threatening missions. As it turns
out, she has been involved in numerous prior engagements
where local hospitals have served as fronts for enemy installations. Enemy soldiers were dressed as doctors and nurses to
camouflage their appearance. This soldier had a number of encounters where she fired on these enemy soldiers. On the instant mission, the soldier and her commanding officer are behind enemy lines taking fire from enemy soldiers. The soldier
sees what appear to be doctors and nurses but, based on her
prior experience with similar facilities, strongly suspects that
they are likely enemy targets who are camouflaging their true
identities. Nevertheless, because she is not sure, the soldier inquires further from her superior, who immediately cuts her off
and again orders her to shoot on the hospital personnel. She
ends up killing a number of individuals. It turns out that these
were actual healthcare workers, not enemy soldiers. She is later prosecuted for murder and raises the obedience to orders defense.
Using the current dual requirement model, my hypothetical soldier would have the same fate as Calley and also be
found guilty of murder. She will likely survive the subjective
422.
423.
424.
425.

Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
See supra Part I.E.1.
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prong of the defense. It does not appear that she knew the order was unlawful and that she was firing on innocent individuals. Again, the focus here is on the soldier’s state of mind and
her related prior experience and training. She had previously
seen hospitals that were used as fronts for enemy installations.
This prior experience made her susceptible to thinking that the
hospital personnel in the instant situation also posed a threat.
However, she will most likely fail the objective scrutiny element. Would a person of common understanding have known
the order to be manifestly illegal? Probably. Again, this hypothetical soldier does not carry any of the personal experience or
training of the defendant. Similar to Calley’s prior experience
with villagers serving as enemy soldiers, this soldier’s prior experience with hospitals serving as enemy fronts is not relevant.
The inquiry centers on a gut reaction of the order standing
alone. The fact that the defendant was taking fire is also not
relevant to assessing this knowledge requirement. What matters is what a soldier would have perceived in the defendant’s
situation. Here, the defendant was asked to attack what appeared to be doctors and nurses. These individuals were behind
enemy lines treating wounded soldiers and gave no indication
that they were combatants. A jury could easily find that a person of common understanding would have known the order was
unlawful at first blush and thus convict the defendant of murder.
This result seems counterintuitive, particularly when the
soldier tried to question the order, even amidst enemy fire.
None of these mitigating factors were present in Calley’s situa426
tion, which may explain why our intuitions differ in the instant case. Yet, under the current model, my hypothetical soldier and Calley stand together. The hesitation and urgency of
the situation are not important, because the operative question
under this test focuses on whether a soldier of common understanding would have known the order was unlawful, not
whether such a soldier of common understanding would have
followed the order.
Employing the entrapment model instead better serves our
intuitions in distinguishing these two cases. Using the subjective test, the analysis centers solely on the defendant’s state of
427
mind. Was my hypothetical soldier predisposed to commit the
426. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–24.
427. See supra Part IV.A.1.
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crime? A jury would look at a variety of factors, including the
soldier’s prior history of this type of conduct, the eagerness or
reluctance to obey the order, and whether the soldier suggested
taking the action. My hypothetical soldier had no history of firing on innocent medical personnel. In her prior deployments,
the soldier only encountered and fired upon hospitals that
served as enemy fronts. She also tried to question the order,
showing that she was reluctant to shoot the individuals. Finally, the soldier did not suggest taking the action. Combined, these facts point to someone who was not predisposed to commit
the crime. This tracks our intuitions that the hypothetical soldier should not be responsible.
The facts relating to Calley would suggest a different conclusion under the subjective test, and rightfully so. While the
evidence indicated Calley did not have a history of firing on in428
nocent villagers, the other considerations would militate in
favor of predisposition. There was no evidence that he questioned the commanding officer’s order or otherwise showed any
429
reluctance in following it. He was presumably first given the
order at a briefing the day before but did not show any hesita430
tion at that time, or any time thereafter. Furthermore, he
431
commanded his subordinates to carry out the killings. While
some refused, Calley followed through on shooting the civil432
ians. Together, these facts point to someone who seemed eager or otherwise inclined to carry out the act. This conclusion
tracks our intuitions that Calley, but not my hypothetical soldier, should be held responsible for the killings.
The objective test, and its focus on the nature of the order
and the surrounding circumstances, also preserves our intuitions regarding these two cases. Here, a court would ask
whether a soldier of common understanding in the same position realistically would have been able to resist or otherwise re433
fuse the order. Take again my hypothetical soldier. Here, it
seems that the circumstances would not have allowed a soldier
to refuse or otherwise effectively question the order. Timing
was of the essence, as they were taking fire from another direction. The defendant in fact tried to question the order, which
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.

See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–25.
Id. at 23–24.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id.
See supra Part IV.A.2.
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her commanding officer quickly repeated. The collective circumstances suggest that no soldier of common understanding
would have been able to effectively refuse the order.
Calley’s case comes out differently under this objective test.
There is no evidence suggesting Calley was required to take
434
immediate action. A soldier of common understanding in his
shoes could have refused the order or otherwise waited before
ordering his subordinates to kill the villagers. Indeed, the first
order came at a briefing the day before, which would have giv435
en Calley plenty of time to raise concerns or other questions.
Moreover, during the actual engagement, Calley was not taking
enemy fire or otherwise pressured by the circumstances to im436
mediately follow through on the order. It appears that the villagers were safely guarded, and time was not necessarily of the
437
essence. Perhaps most damning was the fact that other sol438
diers refused to obey Calley’s order to kill the villagers, bolstering the claim that a soldier in Calley’s position surely could
have refused.
The reason the entrapment-based model more closely
tracks our intuitions has a lot to do with the contextual specificity with which it is applied compared with the abstract generality with which the current dual state-of-mind requirement
is employed. Both entrapment tests keep the focus on the situation at hand—analyzing either the soldier’s state of mind or the
circumstances surrounding the feasibility of refusing the order.
The current objective standard, however, takes the focus too
much away from the particulars of the situation and instead
asks what an abstract soldier knows who is not otherwise embedded in what may be a precarious and volatile situation.
Keeping the perspective on the individual situation thus provides a more narrowly tailored defense that better comports
with our intuitions on how these two cases should be re439
solved.
434. See Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 23–24.
435. Id. at 23.
436. See id. at 24.
437. See id.
438. Id.
439. One may take issue with my hypothetical and accuse me of constructing a scenario that quite conveniently passes both entrapment tests. Suppose
that my hypothetical soldier did not question the order, or that she was not
taking enemy fire. Would these differences potentially change the results under the subjective and objective entrapment tests? Yes. But there is nothing
problematic with this result. The purpose here was to present a scenario
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CONCLUSION
One of the primary aims of criminal law is for the government to regulate behavior among its citizens. For this reason,
criminal law statutes, by and large, apply uniformly to all citizens. Logically, it makes sense that criminal law defenses
should also aim to regulate behavior and establish a uniform
standard. This is why almost all these defenses (e.g., selfdefense, duress, and mistake of law) require the court to engage
in some level of objective scrutiny. To allow otherwise would
frustrate the aim of establishing a uniform code of criminal
conduct. Idiosyncratic beliefs and characteristics would ultimately create inconsistent verdicts among defendants.
But the considerations are different when the same government prosecuting the case is also pressuring the defendant.
While regulating behavior remains important, the focus shifts
from the behavior of private citizens to the behavior of the government. Indeed, this seems to be the crux of the entrapment
defense and its unique requirements. This focus on the government holds with greater force in the military context. Soldiers perform a valuable service for the government—a service
that requires obedience to orders. We must be mindful of this
consideration when constructing the contours of an obedience
to orders defense should they commit a crime in connection
with their service. To be sure, soldiers face a striking dilemma
when confronted with an order that turns out to be unlawful.
Disobeying the command carries the threat of criminal punishment, but following the order may also lead to criminal punishment. To some extent, this situation cannot be fully prevented, nor should it be. We do not want soldiers to blindly
follow their superiors if this means committing a crime. However, reconceptualization of the obedience to orders defense
along the lines of entrapment satisfies this concern without
unduly prejudicing the defendant or placing future soldiers in
similar compromising situations. The inquiry appropriately
keeps the focus on the specific situation and in turn preserves
our intuitions of when liability should be imposed. The end result is a defense that is more narrowly tailored than the curwhere our intuitions clearly differ from the Calley case. Revising my scenario
along the aforementioned lines only means that our intuitions may not be
clear and that reasonable jurors could disagree whether my soldier should be
found guilty. I welcome this conclusion. This Article’s realignment of obedience
to orders does not seek to create a foolproof defense, but rather one that is
more narrowly tailored to the situation and in turn better tracks our intuitions
(to the extent there is agreement) than the current model.
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rent defense, and one that better serves soldiers caught in this
difficult situation.

